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The Dispute Resolution Market
GERHARD WAGNER†
INTRODUCTION
Since the days of 1979 when Landes and Posner
published their seminal paper on “Adjudication as a Private
Good,” it has become increasingly common to think of
adjudication as a service that is offered in markets which
may be more or less competitive.1 The most obvious
illustration supporting this view, and one to which Landes
and Posner referred to explicitly, is, of course, arbitration.2
Under the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, arbitration
agreements representing the parties’ choice of the tribunal
that best fits their interests are valid and enforceable.3
Several arbitral institutions and numerous actual and wantto-be arbitrators have built their businesses and compete for
disputes that they can resolve on this legal basis.4
For a long time, the world of adjudication through public
courts was based on the opposing principle of “non-ouster.”
Under this doctrine, not only arbitration agreements,5 but
also contractual forum selection clauses that re-allocated
† Professor of Law, Humboldt-University at Berlin, Germany, and Professor of
Fundamentals of Private Law at Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University
Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago
Law School. Thanks to Omri Ben Shahar and Stefan Vogenauer for helpful
comments.
1. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979).
2. Id. at 245-53.
3. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.”).
4. See infra Part IV.C.
5. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 450-51 (1874); Tobey v.
Cnty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845); Meacham v.
Jamestown, F. & C. R. Co., 105 N.E. 653, 656 (N.Y. 1914); Gitler v. Russian Co.,
108 N.Y.S. 793, 794 (App. Div. 1908).
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cases between courts were held to be against public policy
and were therefore unenforceable.6 The doctrine of nonouster had the practical effect that courts were both shielded
from competition and excluded from participating in it. This
state of the law changed in 1972 when the U.S. Supreme
Court embraced the principle of party autonomy regarding
choice of a judicial forum in the seminal case of M/S Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Company.7 With this decision and others
that followed,8 freedom of contract, which already governed
the substantive law, was transposed to the sphere of civil
procedure. Since another seminal Supreme Court decision
issued in 1991 in the case of Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute,
there is no doubt that forum selection clauses in contracts
will generally be enforced in American courts, even if they
are part of boilerplate used in transactions with consumers.9
Four decades after the Bremen decision was handed
down, forum selection is once again attracting the interest of

6. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 451; Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill
Paper Co., 111 N.E. 678, 679–81 (Mass. 1916); Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72
Mass. (6 Gray) 174, 181–83 (1856). For a review of the case law, see James T.
Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts, 65
KY. L.J. 1, 7-12 (1976); Leandra Lederman, Viva Zapata!: Toward a Rational
System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 422, 427-28 (1991).
7. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1972); cf. Gilbert,
supra note 6, at 24-28.
8. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); Royal Bed & Spring
Co. v. Famossul Industria, 906 F.2d 45, 48-53 (1st Cir. 1990); Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co.
v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 373-78 (7th Cir. 1990); Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro
ed Altrigestione, 858 F.2d 905, 912-16 (3rd Cir. 1988).
9. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991); cf. Lee
Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 707-12 (1992);
Walter W. Heiser, Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts: Limitations on
Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 553 (1993);
Jeffrey A. Liesemer, Carnival’s Got the Fun . . . And the Forum: A New Look at
Choice-Of-Forum Clauses and the Unconscionability Doctrine After Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 1025 (1992); Edward A. Purcell,
Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and
the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423 (1992); Michael E. Solimine, ForumSelection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51
(1992).
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scholars.10 This time, the issue is no longer whether such
agreements are enforceable, but what the real-world effect of
freedom of choice has been in the recent past and what it will
be in the foreseeable future. To what degree have the parties
availed themselves of their freedom of choice? Did their
choices affect the distribution of cases between courts? How
have judges and lawmakers reacted to possible shifts in
demand for judicial services offered by particular judicial
systems? In answering these questions, there is a lot to
discover, as several jurisdictions have deliberately entered
the competition for disputes.11 The tipping point came when
the State of New York set up the business court division of
its court system in order to attract high-profile cases.12 Other
states have since followed suit, albeit sometimes with less
success, and competitive forces remain strong to the present
day.
Along with all the enthusiasm about interjurisdictional
competition, another line of analysis exists that seems to
cover exactly the same ground but from a different
perspective. On this view, competition between courts is
tolerable at best but not desirable, as it opens up the space
for forum shopping. Courts will try to outperform each other
in becoming ever more plaintiff-friendly. A pertinent example
is patent litigation.13 In patent litigation, there are a handful
of districts that attract a disproportionate amount of the
infringement cases in the country. These so-called “rocketdocket” courts seem to achieve their success, at least in part,

10. See Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial
Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2008); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of
Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475
(2009) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York].
11. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An
Empirical Study of Infringement Litigation 1985–2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 58 (2011).
12. See infra Part IV.D.
13. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 11; see also Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice
Scalia’s “Renegade Jurisdiction”: Lessons for Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV.
111, 125–34 (2008).
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by favoring plaintiffs over the legitimate interests of
defendants.14
The question as to how these two worlds—the bright side
of interjurisdictional competition and the grim version of
forum shopping—relate to each other is still unexplored. It
seems that the same phenomenon that is in one instance
celebrated as promoting procedural efficiency through
competition between civil justice systems is condemned in
another for opening the door to strategic choice of forum and
a resulting degradation of judicial standards. This Article
makes the claim that the core issue raised by
interjurisdictional competition for disputes is identical to the
parallel phenomena of competition for corporate charters and
for bankruptcy filings. Through a process that has correctly
been classified as competitive, the state of Delaware
managed to attract the better part of incorporations in the
U.S., leading to a dominance of Delaware’s corporate law over
the corporate laws of all other states.15 Beginning in the
1990s, a similar development was observed in bankruptcy
law, where Delaware, together with New York, began to
outperform other jurisdictions by offering rules and decisions
more friendly to the bankruptcy bar and the interests of
current management.16 The case of corporate charter
business has been examined by extensive literature that
explicitly draws on the economic concept of competition to
answer the question whether the so-called “Delaware-effect”
instigated a race to the top, toward an optimal corporate law,
or rather instigated a race to the bottom, i.e. a corporate law

14. See Vishnubhakat, supra note 11.
15. For discussions, compare ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE LAW (1993), and Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of
the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985), with Lucian Bebchuk et
al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 1775 (2002), and Lucian Bebchuck & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and
Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1168 (1999).
16. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 49-76, 124-28, 137-38 (2005) [hereinafter
LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE]; Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty,
Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (2007).
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that benefits managers at the expense of shareholders. 17
Professor LoPucki has eloquently raised the proposition that,
in the bankruptcy context, competition for cases is a bad
thing and should prompt a response, but this proposition has
never triggered a nearly as thorough and broad debate for
corporate law.18 With respect to the choice between different
systems of dispute resolution, however, the topic has been
ignored altogether.
The present Article fills this void. It brings the two topics
of interjurisdictional competition and forum shopping
together and asks whether one hypothesis or the other
provides a more adequate account of reality. With regard to
decisions that choose from a menu of mechanisms of dispute
resolution, it is essential to draw a distinction between
unilateral and bilateral choice. In one instance, the choice is
made unilaterally by one party only—typically the plaintiff—
while in the other, the choice is made together by the consent
of both parties. It will be argued that this feature, whether
the forum is selected by only one party or by both disputants,
makes all the difference. In essence, unilateral choice,
inevitable as it may be, is something the legal system needs
to worry about and should take care to limit and rein in. In
contrast, bilateral choices made by both parties deserve to be
given full deference. Consensual choice of forum not only
implements the preferences of the parties, but also
stimulates a competitive process of constant improvement of
dispute resolution processes.
Before exploring the distinction between unilateral and
bilateral choice in more detail, it is helpful to clarify the
concept of competition as applied to adjudication and judicial
dispute resolution. Part I of the Article identifies the core of
the concept of competition that was developed with a view to
private markets for goods and services, not for governmental
17. For the proposition of a race to the bottom, see William L. Cary, Federalism
and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663, 664-66 (1974).
For the opposing view opposing view of a race to the top, see Ralph K. Winter,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 251, 254-62 (1977). For more nuanced discussions, see the sources cited
supra note 15.
18. See sources cited supra note 16. But see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Beyond Recidivism, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 343 (2006).
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functions such as judicial dispute resolution by public courts
that are charged with enforcing the law. Nonetheless,
competition has been outgrowing these narrow confines and
has developed into an economic concept that is able to
capture a broader range of human activities, including the
adjudication of disputes. It is therefore legitimate to speak of
a market for adjudication and of judicial dispute resolution
as a product.
Part II identifies the demand side and the supply side of
the dispute resolution market and introduces the basic
distinction between unilateral and bilateral competition. As
will be shown, this distinction is not a conceptual idea that is
tied to a particular legal or economic theory that may be
accepted or rejected for one reason or another, but rather the
distinction presents itself a feature ingrained in the structure
of real-world disputes.
The Article then hones in on unilateral competition. Part
III supplies an in-depth analysis of the mechanics and effects
of unilateral forum choice. At a theoretical level, it explores
the plaintiff’s considerations in making the decision to file
suit in one court rather than another. It then confronts the
theoretical model with reality and examines the evidence
that supports the existence of unilateral competition. As will
be explained in more detail below, it is justified to assume
that some courts, to a degree at least, respond to the demand
of plaintiffs for a friendly court, thus setting off a process that
may adequately be described as competitive. Part III
concludes in posing the ultimate normative question of
whether unilateral competition is a good or bad thing. And
the answer is clear: unrestrained unilateral competition sets
off a race to the bottom in the sense of a depreciation of the
procedural standards necessary for the accurate enforcement
of the law. For this reason, courts and lawmakers are well
advised to curtail unilateral competition as best they can.
Part IV of the Article explores another world, namely the
one of bilateral choice, in which the parties agree to have
their dispute litigated or arbitrated in a particular court or
arbitral tribunal. This world can exist only because the
disputants, in spite of all the antagonism between them,
harbor a set of shared interests that they draw on when they
agree on the choice of a court or tribunal. The essential point
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here is that parties making a consensual choice in favor of a
particular court seek to optimize the accurate enforcement of
their bargain, i.e. of the commercial contract that later turns
into the subject matter of their dispute. Courts intending to
be responsive to this kind of bilateral demand voiced by both
parties together must therefore offer processes that promise
a high degree of accuracy coupled with low costs of dispute
resolution, in other words, a process that optimizes its
benefits and its costs. While it would be too strong a claim to
suggest that judges mimic the behavior of suppliers catering
to a private market for services, there is evidence from some
jurisdictions that courts and lawmakers, often stimulated by
the local bar, pulled together in order to make their systems
more “attractive” to potential litigants. The analysis of
bilateral competition concludes with posing the same
normative question that was used to evaluate unilateral
forum choice, i.e. whether consensual forum choice is
desirable. The answer is straightforward and affirmative.
Inasmuch as parties strive to balance the benefits and costs
of dispute resolution, they help to optimize the incentives to
comply with the terms of their bargain. To the extent that
courts respond to this type of demand, a process of constant
improvement of mechanisms of dispute resolution is set off
that may adequately be described as a race to the top.
The optimistic conclusion of Part IV (that bilateral
competition is desirable as a means of improving the quality
of judicial services) is clouded by some caveats and
qualifications that are the focus of Part V. One such caveat
results from network effects. Parties seem to make the choice
for a particular forum not in isolation, but in conjunction with
the choice of the applicable substantive law. The substantive
law and the judicial services of a particular jurisdiction are
“sold” as a package, and these packages become all the more
attractive as the number of users increases. The results are
first-mover and lock-in effects: jurisdictions that used to be
among the most attractive in the past may be able to defend
their position over their competitors, notwithstanding the
inferior quality of the services they offer today.
Another serious problem is caused by the principal-agent
relationship existing between uninformed parties and their
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attorneys.19 In most cases, at least, clients are unable to make
informed choices between courts and thus have to rely on the
advice of lawyers. The resulting agency relationship creates
room for the attorney-agent to exploit the lack of information
on the part of the principal-client for his or her own gain by
advising the client to file suit in a court that is not in the
client’s best interest but is beneficial to the attorney. Finally,
unfettered competition in the market of adjudication, even if
it is stimulated by bilateral choices, may lead to negative
externalities between jurisdictions.20 The “acquiring”
jurisdiction may be forced to use public funds to subsidize the
judicial resolution of disputes that arose in another
jurisdiction, while the “ceding” jurisdiction loses control over
the enforcement of its laws. Together, these effects suggest
that competition in the area of dispute resolution services
will never be perfect and possibly should not even try to be.
The Article concludes with the question of whether states
may be able to compete on both levels, i.e. in the area
dominated by unilateral choice, as well as in the market for
consensual forum selection. Surprisingly, the answer may be
in the affirmative. The key is to bifurcate the court structure
and to offer a specialized division of the judiciary to litigants
who are jointly looking for the most efficient mechanism to
enforce their bargain. The remaining courts of general
jurisdiction may then be left to compete in the market of
unilateral forum choice by adapting their rules and
procedures in an effort to attract more claims.
I. COMPETITION BETWEEN CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS?
A. The Concept of Competition, as Applied to Dispute
Resolution
In economics, “competition” is not merely a descriptive
concept but also a normative one, denoting something
positive and desirable. The first fundamental theorem of
welfare economics asserts that a market with perfect
19. See infra Part V.B.
20. See infra Part V.C.
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competition yields Pareto-optimal outcomes.21 Perfect
competition is characterized by large numbers of small firms
competing for customers in markets to which free access is
guaranteed. Each supplier must take the price as given as he
is too small to affect it with his own supply so that price
equals marginal cost, and profits are zero.22
These conditions are obviously not satisfied in the
market for judicial services, to which access is regulated,
where the number of suppliers is limited, where market
participants are working on fixed salaries, and where
valuable services may be offered for a price significantly
below cost. On the other hand, it would be too easy to discard
the notion of competition of judicial systems altogether. The
existence of competition in the market for judicial services
was particularly obvious in the days of Adam Smith, who
wrote in his The Wealth of Nations:
The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support
of the different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavored
to draw to itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that
account, willing to take cognisance of many suits which were not
originally intended to fall under its jurisdiction. . . . In consequence
of such fictions it came, in many cases, to depend altogether upon
the parties before what court they would choose to have their cause
tried; and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and
impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could. The
present admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England
was, perhaps, originally in a great measure formed by this
emulation which anciently took place between their respective
judges; each judge endeavouring to give, in his own court, the
speediest and most effectual remedy which the law would admit for
every sort of injustice.23

21. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Invisible Hand and Modern Welfare Economics 2-3
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3641, 1991).
22. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 149 (19th ed.
2010).
23. 2 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 208 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1960)
(1776). As to the details of this system of judicial remuneration and its
consequences for the development of the common law, see Daniel Klerman,
Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1179 (2007).
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In his standard elaboration of the concept of competition,
George Stigler defines competition as “a rivalry between
individuals (or groups or nations) [that] arises whenever two
or more parties strive for something that all cannot obtain.”24
He added that “a concept that is applicable to two cobblers or
a thousand ship owners or to tribes and nations is necessarily
loosely drawn.”25 On the basis of his broad definition, the
existence of competition in the market of legal services is
obvious: courts, arbitral institutions, arbitrators, and
mediators compete for cases, disputants compete for
competent decision-makers, and plaintiffs compete for the
forum most sympathetic to their claims. Alas, one might be
confident that the “invisible hand” of competition leads to
optimal outcomes that cannot be improved without lowering
someone’s utility.26
The question explored in this Article is: does it really
work this way with regard to civil justice systems? The
analysis to follow is not limited to civil justice systems in the
technical sense of the term, i.e. public officials vested with
the powers of government, sitting in public courts, and
deciding cases under rules of law. While the choice between
systems of judicial dispute resolution remains at the core, the
market for judicial services cannot be analyzed without
regard to the numerous offerings of “alternative”—meaning
non-judicial—methods of dispute resolution. As private
24. George J. Stigler, Competition, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 51, 51 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
25. Id.
26. 1 SMITH, supra note 23, at 13 (“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher,
the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love,
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but
a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens.
Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed
people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence. But though
this principle ultimately provides him with all the necessaries of life which he has
occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occasion for
them. The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the same manner
as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase. With the money
which one man gives him he purchases food. The old clothes which another
bestows upon him he exchanges for other old clothes which suit him better, or for
lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, clothes, or
lodging, as he has occasion.”).
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parties offering alternative dispute resolution services
operate in private markets, they must be accounted for in a
meaningful analysis of competition between judicial systems.
The real market to analyze is not the market for judicial
services but, more broadly, the market for dispute resolution
services. That includes not only the settling of disputes via
arbitration, but also the many varieties of alternative dispute
resolution, such as expert proceedings, conciliation,
mediation, etc. The parties to a dispute are confronted with
a rich menu of options, ranging from simple face-to-face
negotiations to highly stylized litigation in public court.
These options are never perfect substitutes for one another,
and some of them are not substitutes at all, as they may be
combined to form a multi-layered mechanism of dispute
resolution. Many disputes start out with negotiations
between the parties that may then lead to mediation, and
from there to arbitration, in order to reach the courts after
the award was made and an application for leave to enforce
was filed.
The fact that the different products available on the
market for dispute resolution services may be substitutes for
one another but may also be combined complicates the
analysis.27 The presentation to follow will not explore the
various tools and mechanisms of alternative dispute
resolution in detail, but will focus on solely judicial
disposition of disputes and arbitration instead. In doing so,
arbitration is understood to be close to a perfect substitute
for judicial resolution of disputes.
B. The Tiebout Model of Systems Competition
The basic concepts of welfare economics have been
applied to rivaling governments and countries, building on
the Tiebout model of competition for the supply of public
goods.28 Within this framework, people and businesses shop
27. See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12-19 (1995).
28. For the original discussion of this model, see the pathbreaking piece by
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956). For an application of the ideas of systems’ competition to the legal field,
see Anthony Ogus, The Economic Approach: Competition between Legal Systems,
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around for the jurisdiction or community whose mix of
benefits and burdens best meets their preferences.29 Local
governments are sellers of public goods to citizens and
businesses, and they charge a price for the bundle of goods
offered in the form of taxes levied on their customers. On the
demand side, firms and citizens pick the combination of taxes
and public goods that best satisfy their preferences. This
drives lawmakers and regulators to improve the mix of taxes
and public goods they offer in order to attract new citizens
and firms. This process continues up to the point where local
governments approach their optimal composition and size.30
Over time, competition weeds out those governments that do
a poor job, i.e. those which charge excessive taxes compared
to the poor quality of public goods they can offer.
C. Systems Competition in Dispute Resolution
Tiebout’s conclusions are based on the assumption, that
he made explicitly, that consumer-voters are fully mobile and
will move to the community that best satisfies their
preferences.31 However, this assumption is completely
unrealistic, particularly in the international context where
linguistic, cultural, and institutional differences make
movements from one country to another complicated and
fraught with high transaction costs.32 With regard to the
market for dispute resolution services, however, the
assumption that the switch from one jurisdiction to another
in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 155, 155-67 (Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds.,
2007); see also Anthony Ogus, Competition Between National Legal Systems: A
Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
405 (1999). For a modern treatment, see Hans-Werner Sinn, The New Systems
Competition 1-2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8747, 2002).
29. Tiebout, supra note 28, at 418 (“[T]he consumer-voter moves to that
community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences.”).
30. Id. at 419 (“[C]ommunities below the optimum size seek to attract new
residents to lower average costs. Those above optimum size do just the opposite.
Those at an optimum try to keep their populations constant.”).
31. Id.
32. Cf. Robert Inman & Daniel Rubinfeld, Federalism, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 661, 673-74 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds.,
2000).
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can be made at low cost may actually be valid. The choice of
a particular court or other dispute resolution mechanism
does not force citizens to physically leave their jurisdiction in
order to relocate elsewhere. Rather, similar to the case of
choice of law, firms and consumers may make “virtual”
choices, i.e. opt in favor of a mechanism of dispute resolution
without changing their permanent affiliation with a
particular jurisdiction and its system of civil justice.33 The
disputants are therefore able to import dispute resolution
services by opting in favor of one system of civil justice or
arbitral dispute resolution rather than another.
The analogy to choice of law is not complete, however,
because processes of dispute resolution normally necessitate
the physical presence of the disputants or their
representatives at a single location, e.g., the court. In this
sense, there is still an element of “voting with one’s feet”
involved. The burden associated with such travel
requirements is far from the one attached to moving one’s
residence or seat to another jurisdiction. Still, as we shall see,
the costs of “moving” to another jurisdiction temporarily in
order to use mechanisms of dispute resolution there play a
role in the calculus of the parties when they make the
relevant choices.34
Another assumption made in Tiebout’s model
analogizing competition in private markets with competition
between jurisdictions is that there are no spill-overs between
jurisdictions, i.e. “no external economies or diseconomies
between communities.”35 The hypothesis that the competitive
behavior of the various jurisdictions does not cause effects
outside the respective community is realistic with regard to
the resolution of a dispute between the parties involved.
However, dispute resolution is not the only good produced by
civil justice systems. Another function of the court system is
to clarify and amplify the law, to develop it into new areas,
and to change existing rules where this turns out to be
33. For a full exploration of this argument, see Gerhard Wagner, The
Economics of Harmonization: The Case of Contract Law, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
995, 1007-11 (2002).
34. See infra Part III.D.1.
35. Tiebout, supra note 28, at 419.
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necessary.36 To the extent that competition in the litigation
market shifts demand from one jurisdiction to another, the
number of cases and court decisions in the ceding jurisdiction
declines, and the amplification and rule-making functions of
the courts suffer. These consequences raise serious issues
that need to be addressed once the dynamics of systems
competition in the litigation market have been explored.37
II. THE MARKET FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES
A. The Supply Side of the Market for Dispute Resolution
Assuming that the product traded in the litigation
market is dispute resolution, it is essential to identify
demand and supply. Who demands what from whom as a
supplier? Subject to the above qualification, that mediation
and other supplemental forms of alternative dispute
resolution are ignored,38 the supply side of the market for
dispute resolution consists of courts and arbitrators who
compete for business in the form of cases brought to them for
the purpose of decision-making.
B. The Demand for Dispute Resolution
1. The Distinction Between Unilateral and Bilateral
Demand
If courts and arbitrators form the supply side of the
market for dispute resolution, who is on the demand side?
The question is worth asking because, per definition, a
dispute requires at least two parties. The presence of several
parties on one side of the supply-and-demand relation may
be unproblematic, as long as the interests of the parties are
well aligned with each other. This is not true in the case of a
dispute, as the interests of the parties there are antagonistic
by their very nature. In fact, both parties are competing
against each other for a favorable outcome of the dispute
36. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, Civil Procedure: General, in 5
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 32, at 16; Landes & Posner,
supra note 1, at 236.
37. See infra Part V.C.
38. See supra Part I.A.
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resolution process. In the familiar case of a money claim,
everything the plaintiff wins, the defendant loses, and vice
versa. On the other hand, it would be wrong to think that the
interests of the disputants are fully antagonistic, as there
will be areas of overlapping concerns. Most importantly, both
parties will want to limit the costs of whatever dispute
resolution mechanism they choose.
The distinction between shared and antagonistic
interests of potential litigants maps onto two different types
of demand for dispute resolution services. In the case of
unilateral demand, only one party, typically the plaintiff,
acts upon her preferences, while in the other category of
bilateral demand, both parties have to fit their preferences
together in order to make a joint decision in favor of a court
or other dispute resolution mechanism. As they have to agree
on how to make that choice, their demand is bilateral.
Generally, the choice between several competent courts
or, more broadly, civil justice systems is for the plaintiff to
make. Absent an agreement of the parties creating an
obligation to use arbitration rather than litigation, and
without a forum selection clause vesting exclusive
jurisdiction in a particular court, the potential plaintiff has
the privilege of making a unilateral choice. The default rule
in civil procedure provides that, absent valid agreements
made by the parties, the plaintiff has the authority to pick
the court that will hear and decide the case. In this type of
situation, the demand side of the market for dispute
resolution services is populated by potential plaintiffs only.
The case of bilateral demand is analogous to the case,
familiar from the substantive law of contract, that the parties
deviate from default rules. Today, most legal systems allow
the parties to derogate from the general law of civil procedure
in various ways, even though no jurisdiction has gone as far
as to enforce derogative agreements across the board.39 In
particular, the parties are authorized to vest an arbitral
tribunal or a public court with exclusive jurisdiction,
derogating the jurisdiction of all other courts that would have
39. Cf. Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contractualizing Procedure 8-13
(Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323056.
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been competent otherwise.40 In this type of situation, the
choice is made by the disputants together, as both sides have
to agree to use one court rather than another. Even so, the
interests of the parties in the outcome of the dispute
resolution process remain antagonistic; the agreement
extends only to the person or institution that serves as the
decision-maker and to the nature of the dispute-resolution
process.
2. Ex Ante and Ex Post Agreements
It is tempting to link the distinction between unilateral
and bilateral choices to the other distinction between ex ante
and ex post agreements on dispute resolution. Where the
parties are in a contractual relationship with one another,
there is the option of agreeing on the competent court ex ante,
before a dispute has arisen. In practice, the parties regularly
include in their commercial contracts forum selection or
arbitration clauses fixing the mode and place of dispute
resolution. Obviously, transaction costs are much lower in
this situation than in the state ex post. In the situation ex
ante, the parties sit together anyway and negotiate their
commercial contract. The forum selection or arbitration
clause is just one element in a set of contested issues that the
parties must settle in order to close the deal. The fact that
the parties have to resolve a multitude of issues makes it
easier to compromise on any one of them, as it is possible to
compensate a “loss” here with a “gain” there. Even more
importantly, in the situation ex ante, the facts and
circumstances of the dispute that will arise in the future are
still unknown. Neither party can anticipate whether he or
she will find himself or herself in the role of the plaintiff or
that of the defendant;41 whether he or she will have a stronger
interest in confidentiality or in full disclosure; whether it will
be important to him or her to enforce the judgment in a
particular jurisdiction, or to resist enforcement in another,
etc. To borrow a term from John Rawls, the parties negotiate
behind a veil of ignorance because they are unable to know
40. See sources cited supra notes 7-9.
41. This Article assumes a female plaintiff and a male defendant.
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their position as plaintiff or defendant, the strengths and
weaknesses of their claims or defenses, or their collateral
interests in the litigation that might arise in the future.42
This makes it easier to reach an agreement.
Private ordering ex ante is only possible where the
parties have been in a relationship, contractual or otherwise,
before the dispute arose. Where there was no contract or
other legal relationship prior to the dispute, as is true in most
cases involving torts and similar claims, the parties may still
agree on a dispute resolution mechanism ex post. In this
situation, the veil of ignorance regarding the nature of the
dispute has been lifted, the roles as plaintiff or defendant
have become clear, the stakes are obvious, the parties are in
a bilateral monopoly because the only potential contracting
partner is the opponent, and they need to agree on a single
issue: the court or tribunal in which to litigate or arbitrate
the dispute. While such agreements are possible and do occur
in the real world, they are difficult to negotiate and involve
high transaction costs.43
In most instances, unilateral choice of the dispute
resolution mechanism will involve claims of non-contractual
nature, and bilateral choice will concern claims that have
grown out of contractual relationships. However, the fit
between the categories is not perfect. Even parties who were
in a contractual relationship with one another, but failed to
agree on a dispute resolution clause ex ante, always retain
the option to come together ex post and fix jurisdiction with
a particular court or arbitral tribunal with regard to a
dispute that has already arisen.
C. Two Types of Competition
The distinction between the two types of demand—
unilateral demand and bilateral demand—is central to an
42. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (1971).
43. See Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: The Feasibility
of Post-Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
313, 322 (2003) (reporting the finding of his survey that less than 10% of AAA
arbitrations involving disputes between businesses were the result of postdispute agreements).
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analysis of competition in the market for dispute resolution,
even though it is mostly ignored in the literature.44 From a
descriptive as well as a normative point of view, the outcome
reached in a competitive process is contingent upon the input
in terms of preferences. To take an example from an
unrelated area: if consumers have a preference for highpowered cars, the supply side of the automobile market will
accommodate such preferences, and more cars with the
appropriate features will be sold. From a dynamic
perspective, more resources will be channeled into
researching and developing high-powered cars, and a whole
industry may be led onto this path. If, on the other hand,
consumers had a strong preference for fuel efficiency, then
demand would favor other types of cars, the automakers
would compete to match this kind of demand, and, in the long
term, resources would be channeled into research for more
fuel-efficient cars. Over time, one group of consumers may
shift from one preference towards the other and back, as has
happened in the U.S. several times in response to major
changes in oil prices.
In the same manner, the competitive process will yield
different outcomes, depending on whether plaintiffs alone or
both parties together represent the demand side. Where
plaintiffs have the demand side to themselves, only their
preferences count, and the supply side, e.g., courts and
arbitrators, will compete to meet these preferences and
nobody else’s. If, on the other hand, both parties share in the
demand side, they will articulate only those preferences that
they share, and these will be different from any one party’s
preferences. Again, the supply side in the market for dispute
resolution services will react to the articulated preferences of
actors on the demand side, and the competitive process will
be shaped accordingly. As we shall see, both categories of
competition exist in the real world, generating different
outcomes and prompting different concerns.

44. It is laudable that some authors dealing with issues of competition between
justice systems make it clear that they only talk about bilateral competition. See,
e.g., Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 10, at 6 (“[W]e limit our focus to
litigation in which all parties consent to employing the foreign court.”); see also
id. at 15.
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III. UNILATERAL COMPETITION FOR A FRIENDLY COURT
A. The Options and Why They Matter
Where there is no choice between courts or between
judicial and arbitral dispute resolution, there can be no
competition. In a world without arbitration and with clear
and straight jurisdictional rules that vest jurisdiction for a
given case in one court only, plaintiffs would have to live with
whatever court was competent. Yet, in reality, the reverse is
true, as plaintiffs have a choice between multiple courts that
are competent to hear and decide their case, in addition to
the option to shun the court system altogether and turn to
arbitration.
Within the U.S., the range of options available to a
plaintiff is particularly broad, thanks to the federal structure
of the nation and the double-tiered judicial system it
maintains. As a consequence, the case that only one forum is
competent to hear and decide a particular dispute is not the
rule, but a rare exception, and the choice between the several
courts that have jurisdiction may well be outcomedeterminative. Each state within the Union operates its own
court system, its own choice of law rules, and distinct systems
of tort and contract law. The legal rules allocating
jurisdiction are largely left to the states, as long as basic
constitutional guarantees are observed.45 In addition to the
judicial systems of the several states, there is a federal
system with its own courts and rules of jurisdiction. Even
though a federal court is bound to apply the same choice of
law rules46 and the same substantive law as the state court of
the state in which the federal court is located,47 outcomes
might still be different, depending on whether a case is
brought in state court or in federal court.
B. The Plaintiff’s Calculus
Rational and self-interested claimants make the decision
of where to file suit with a view towards maximizing their
45. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
46. E.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
47. E.g., Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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chances of winning and minimizing the costs they are
expected to bear. The immediate costs of using the court
system are the fees charged by the court plus the fees charged
by legal counsel for representation in the forum in question.
Both items together represent the administrative costs (ca) of
using the court’s services. To the extent that they must be
borne by the plaintiff, they are the plaintiff’s expected
administrative costs (cpa). This item is understood to be
independent of the design of the cost allocation rule enforced
by an individual court. Within the domain of the American
rule, cpa represents the filing fee to be paid by the plaintiff
plus the sum of attorney’s fees the plaintiff expects to invest
in the litigation. Within jurisdictions following the English
rule on cost allocation, cpa denotes the expected share of the
costs that the court will allocate to the plaintiff.
The calculations a rational plaintiff would make in order
to select the optimal court are a simple extension of expected
value analysis. Let the probability that plaintiff ultimately
wins a favorable judgment be p, the amount of damages
awarded be X, and the administrative costs she is expected
to bear be cpa; then the plaintiff will bring suit whenever pX
− cpa > 0.48
In a situation where the plaintiff has a range of options
of where to file suit, and provided that the several courts
competent to try the case differ in their treatment of the case
and in the probability that the plaintiff will ultimately
prevail, the calculus needs to be applied with respect to each
competent court. In a scenario with two courts, Court 1 and
Court 2, the plaintiff would need to estimate her chances of
prevailing in Court 1 and in Court 2 (p1 and p2), estimate the
damages that are likely to be awarded by the two courts (X1
and X2), and the amount of legal costs she is likely to have to
bear following suit in either forum (cpa1 and cpa2). The
estimated value of litigation in Court 1 would be p1X1 − cpa1
and the estimated value of litigation in Court 2 would be
equal to p2X2 − cpa2. The plaintiff would file in Court 1 if the
expected value of litigation there would be greater than the
expected value of litigation in Court 2: p1X1 − cpa1 > p2X2 −
48. For a thorough treatment, see Kathrin E. Spier, Litigation, in 1 HANDBOOK
ECONOMICS 259, 264-65 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds.,
2007).
OF LAW AND
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cpa2. In the reverse case, when p2X2 − cpa2 > p1X1 − cpa1, the
plaintiff would turn to Court 2. In theory, these same
calculations could be run with any number of courts that
compete for jurisdiction.
It needs to be mentioned that rational plaintiffs would
have no interest in maximizing the expected value of the
judgment as such.49 What plaintiffs really care about is the
sum of money that they can ultimately recover from the
defendant. In order to be able to do so, it is crucial to select a
court whose judgments carry a high chance of actual
recovery. While forum selection can do nothing to make
defendants richer than they really are, the law of execution
may vary between jurisdictions and the ability to enforce a
judgment abroad may also differ from country to country.
Therefore, rational plaintiffs would select the court with a
view of maximizing the likelihood of actual recovery of any
sum awarded from the defendant, minus costs.
C. Additional Variables
1. Delay
The conventional model outlined above fails to include a
number of variables that are relevant in making the choice
between suing in one court rather than another. One such
item is the cost of delay. Inevitably, dispute resolution takes
time, but the amount of time it takes to reach a final decision
or other resolution of a dispute varies from mechanism to
mechanism and from court to court. In the familiar case of a
claim for money, the losses incurred by the plaintiff while
waiting for a decision enforcing her claim are at least equal
to foregone interest that could have been earned from an
early investment of the money. Plaintiffs, whose financial
structure includes debt that could have been repaid by using
the proceeds from the claim, incur damages equal to the
interest payments that they have to make on the respective
amount of their outstanding debt. Where large sums are
involved, an unresolved dispute may block certain options of
corporate restructuring, such as a merger with another
company. In extreme cases, plaintiffs may even face
49. For a more thorough discussion, see infra Part IV.A.2.
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insolvency due to the long delay in resolving disputes around
claims of high value. Such losses caused by the delay of
dispute resolution may be offset by awards of pre-judgment
interest and rights to damages, but their availability and
scope depends on the jurisdiction and on the substantive law
chosen by the parties.50 Even where these remedies are
available, they tend to be under-compensatory, especially
where the stakes are high. If the net costs of delay are
denoted cd, rational plaintiffs would choose between different
courts by comparing p1X1 − cpa1 − cpd1 with p2X2 − cpa2 − cpd2.
2. Collateral Harm
Another important concern relates to the benefits and
the harms generated by the process of dispute resolution
itself, regardless of the outcome and the costs it takes to
achieve it. The existing literature acknowledges the fact that
litigation may have “external effects” that need to be
evaluated and included in the plaintiff’s calculus.51 These
authors focus on the effects the decision in a single case may
have on the resolution of future cases between the same
litigants.
One example relates to the familiar situation where the
defendant faces a large number of suits that are all based on
the same fact pattern. Such a scenario is standard in
products liability cases involving design defects. If the design
of a mass-produced commodity has been found to be defective
by a respected court in a single case, the defense in all the
other cases becomes much more difficult to sustain. After the
highest-ranking court of the relevant jurisdiction has found
the product to be defective, litigation in the mass of cases still
pending at lower levels is practically over. In such a setting,
the defendant’s stakes in the first case that comes up for
decision greatly exceed the value of the subject matter in
dispute between the two parties to this lawsuit. An adverse
judgment in one particular case would have large negative
50. Cf. William E. Nelson, Contract Litigation and the Elite Bar in New York
City, 1960-1980, 39 EMORY L.J. 413, 421-22 (1990) (comparing the rate of
prejudgment interest available from courts in New York with the market rates,
which were substantially higher).
51. See Kobayashi & Parker, supra note 36, at 9-12.
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external effects for the defendant and yield corresponding
gains for all the other actual and potential plaintiffs who
were injured by the same kind of product. Of course, the
reverse case, where the additional loss affects a single
plaintiff, while the gains accrue to a multitude of defendants,
is conceivable too.
Gains and losses to the disputants may also be caused by
the procedure itself, regardless of its effects on other similar
cases. The most obvious example involves the disclosure of
confidential information. A party might have an interest not
to disclose certain facts in open court, even if this forum may
lean in her direction and the disclosure would increase her
chances of prevailing. Plaintiffs are well advised to consider
this aspect while making the choice between different courts
and tribunals, as the selection of a process that allows for
broad discovery will increase the willingness of the defendant
to agree to a generous settlement.
The harms or benefits caused by the process of dispute
resolution as such, in ways other than increasing or
decreasing the chances of persuading the decision-maker, are
“collateral” to the litigation or arbitration. The threat of
inflicting collateral harm on the opponent may be used as
leverage in settlement negotiations, increasing the chances
of winning a generous payment. But even if settlement is not
the issue, collateral harms and benefits are clearly relevant.
A celebrity might avoid courts of a jurisdiction simply
because of the intensive media attention that must be
expected if trial is held there.
In a complete model of the plaintiff’s decision on where
to file suit, the collateral harms and benefits would have to
be reflected and expressed in variables. This is not without
difficulty, however, as the complex and diverse collateral
effects of litigation in a particular forum need to be identified
and their strengths estimated. The resulting variable would
have to be a compound of at least two subcategories of
external effects:
1. The expected gain a favorable resolution of the dispute
has on other similar claims of the plaintiff, both those already
pending or to be brought in the future, and vice versa for an
outcome that is adverse to the plaintiff’s interests.
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2. The expected gains from a procedure that imposes
collateral harm on the defendant, and thus increases his
willingness to settle and the amount he is prepared to agree
in settlement, minus any losses the procedure may force on
the plaintiff.
In order to avoid the complexities associated with such
estimations, the net value of collateral harms and benefits,
as perceived by the plaintiff ex ante, shall be captured in the
variable Z, which represents the aggregate of collateral costs
and benefits, and may therefore be positive or negative.
The aggregate of these variables must be added to the
expected value of litigation in one court or another, so that
the plaintiff compares p1X1 − cpa1 − cpd1 + Zp1 with p2X2 − cp2 −
cpd2 + Zp2 and will file suit in Court 2 if p2X2 − cp2 − cpd2 + Zp2
> p1X1 − cp1 − cpd1 + Zp1.
D. Evidence of Unilateral Competition
Up to this point, the analysis was purely theoretical,
exploring the concerns and considerations of a rational
plaintiff who is faced with a menu of courts and tribunals to
choose from. The upshot was that plaintiffs try to maximize
the difference between the expected judgment and the sum of
administrative costs, costs of delay, and collateral effects.
The question now is whether there is evidence suggesting
that this is an adequate description of the decision-making
process real-world plaintiffs go through.
1. Hometown Bias
In reality, most plaintiffs do not engage in extensive
expected value analysis but form intuitions about the most
favorable courts and then compare the expected value of
litigation in the two or three most promising venues. In doing
so, plaintiffs will reason from the assumption that the court
spatially closest to them—their “home court”—will be the
easiest one to persuade. Litigation in one’s home court offers
palpable advantages that work to increase the chance of
prevailing. In many cases, the plaintiff will retain counsel
practicing in the same jurisdiction, so that litigating “at
home” obviates the need to retain another or additional
counsel for representation elsewhere. For the plaintiff’s
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officers and employees, it is clearly more convenient to
litigate at the seat of the company than in a far-away place.
The plaintiff’s evidence may be located close to its own
residence or seat, so that it is easier and safer to present it
there. Finally, the local judges, even if not biased against
foreign defendants, may at least see to it that they do not
prejudice local plaintiffs.
By the same measure that these concerns work to the
advantage of the plaintiff, they tend to disfavor the
defendant; he may have to deal with a judiciary biased
against his interests, he needs to seek out, instruct, and pay
counsel at a distant locale, his officers and employees will
have to travel to a distant court if so required, and the
defendant’s evidence must be shipped there, at his own cost
and risk. These factors taken together suggest that litigating
“at home” is the best option available because it maximizes
the net expected outcome for the plaintiff.
These considerations regarding the calculus a
hypothetical plaintiff will go through in making the decision
of where to file a lawsuit are confirmed by the historical
development of American law and empirical evidence
gathered from the legal landscape of the United States. In
fact, the concern for local bias of the state courts was the
major motivation for the introduction of diversity jurisdiction
of the federal courts in cases involving matters of state law
only under Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.52
The canonical explanation goes back to John Marshall:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties
of every description, it is not less true that the constitution itself
either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such
indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it
has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies
between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different
states.53
52. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41
HARV. L. REV. 483, 492-97 (1928).
53. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809)
(Marshall, C.J.); see also Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111-12
(1945).
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An additional concern that led the framers was their
belief that the federal courts were more sympathetic to, and
supportive of, land owners and large commercial enterprises
operating across state lines.54
The hometown bias is difficult to confirm empirically.
With regard to international litigation involving foreign
parties in American courts, empirical studies have yielded
opposing results, with one study suggesting that foreign
parties fare worse than domestic ones55 while other studies
found that their win rates were actually higher than the one
of domestic parties.56 However, even the authors of these
optimistic studies were cautious to add that “we never said
or implied that anti-foreign bias is nonexistent.”57 Rather,
they maintained that case selection was driving the results,
as foreign parties who fear the bias of local courts will be
more willing to settle and litigate to trial only the strongest
cases.58 As long as the strength of this effect remains in the
unknown, it seems impossible to draw strong conclusions
from empirical findings. In contrast, the perception of the
lawyers who are representing parties in litigation
unequivocally confirms the existence of hometown bias.
Contemporaneous surveys of practitioners reveal that the
preferences for, or the aversions against, local biases are
strong factors in the making of forum selection decisions.
Even though local bias loomed larger for defense attorneys
than for plaintiffs’ attorneys, 44.9% of the members of the
plaintiffs’ bar who had responded to a survey still confessed
that local bias was a major factor in their decision-making.59
54. John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 27 (1948).
55. Kimberley A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1497, 1503-06, 1509-14 (2003).
56. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in
U.S. Courts? Before and After 9/11, 4 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 441, 443 (2007)
[hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia]; Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1120, 1124-25 (1996).
57. Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia, supra note 56, at 445.
58. Id.
59. Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Removal Cases under Diversity and
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 400, 408-09 (1992) (“50.7%
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Interestingly, the only other factor with an even stronger
impact on the forum selection decision was reported to be
“attorney convenience”60—a point worth coming back to when
examining the effects the principal-agent-relationship
between client and attorney has on such decisions.61
2. Forum Shopping
In most cases involving corporate defendants, the range
of courts where suit may be brought is much wider than a
mere choice between state and federal courts, however, as
corporations that operate nationwide are subject to the
jurisdiction of each and every state within the Union. Given
that the state courts, as well as the federal district courts,
apply the procedural law and the choice of law rules of the
state in which they sit,62 there is much to gain from having
one court rather than another hear and decide a case. Local
choice of law rules tend to favor the application of local
substantive law, so that forum selection is a mere conduit for
a choice of the substantive law. This framework provides
members of the plaintiffs’ bar representing groups of victims
who were harmed in different states with the chance of
exploiting the differences between the local regimes in a
broad variety of jurisdictions and to file suit under the tort
law that offers the most favorable combination in terms of
liability, damages, and procedure.63 Even though this option
has been narrowed down by the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, it remains intact with regard to the choice between the

of the responding defense attorneys said that bias against out-of-state litigants
was present in their cases. . . . [A] number of plaintiff counsel agreed that there
is bias against out-of-state defendants. Interestingly, this perception of bias is one
of the few factors which correlates closely with plaintiff counsel’s legal experience,
measured by year of bar admission.”).
60. See id. at 400-03.
61. See infra Part V.B.
62. See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
63. This is true in spite of the limits on choice of law imposed by Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). See Carol Rice Andrews, The
Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the National Debate about “Class
Action Fairness,” 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1320-25 (2005).
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federal district courts and with regard to claims for less than
$5 million.64
The combination of the three principles of (1) diversity
between the legal regimes of the several states, with (2)
jurisdictional equality of all the courts in the nation, and (3)
allocation of the right to choose the competent court to the
plaintiff, generates a pro-plaintiff bias. This effect has been
confirmed by empirical studies. Clermont and Eisenberg
have found a strong pro-plaintiff effect if cases are tried in
the forum of the plaintiff’s choice, rather than in another one
to which the case was transferred.65 One of their studies
focused on cases initially filed in a federal district court, with
one group being tried in the court where the original suit was
filed, while another one was transferred to another forum
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). While the plaintiff’s win rate was
58% in the court where the suit originated, it was only 29%
in the courts to which the case was transferred. The authors
conclude that “venue is worth fighting over because outcome
often turns on forum.”66 The same effect was discovered in
another study that compared the win rates for plaintiffs in
state courts and the win rates in cases that had originated in
state court but had later been removed to the federal courts
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. While the win rates for plaintiffs in
cases decided by state courts is around 71%, it drops to 33%
in cases that originated in a state court system, but were then
moved to a federal court.67 Even though part of the
64. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Action Fairness Act: Aggregation and Its
Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1910-22 (2006); Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1595-97 (2006); Sarah S.
Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1617,
1620 (2006); Thomas E. Willing & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of
Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference does it Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 591 (2006) (discussing empirical data regarding the choice of forum
decisions made by plaintiffs’ attorneys in class actions before and after CAFA).
65. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of
Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511-13 (1995).
66. Id. at 1508.
67. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really
Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593 (1998). While the original data used by the authors
compare win rates in federal courts only, the win rate for plaintiffs in suits filed
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explanation for these differences is the selection effect—the
set of cases that remain in the court where they were filed is
different from the ones that were removed and/or transferred
—the conclusion that forum matters still holds.68 Apart from
the selection effect, other factors are at work: judicial bias,
familiarity and convenience, the rules of procedure, the
applicable choice of law, and the contents of the substantive
law.69 It is part of the professional duty of plaintiff’s counsel
to exploit the variation between different courts by filing
where the likelihood of winning is the highest, or more
precisely, where the expected value of the claim is
maximized.70
E. The Supply Side to Unilateral Competition
The supply side of the market for unilateral choice of
court is populated by the judges and lawmakers in the
jurisdictions that compete for exercising authority over the
case at hand. Their incentives will be explored in more detail
below.71 In the present context, it is sufficient to point to
anecdotal evidence that supports the proposition that judges
and lawmakers in some, certainly not all, jurisdictions are in
the business of attracting claims, particularly in the area of
personal injury litigation.
This seems to be true for so-called “hellhole
jurisdictions,” primarily located in the south-east, along the
coast of the Gulf of Mexico, where courts are said to be more
or less strongly biased against corporate defendants,
particularly in personal injury suits.72 The motives of the
in federal courts is roughly the same as the one in suits filed and decided in state
court. Id. at 596.
68. Id. at 596-99.
69. Id. at 599-600.
70. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 119, 122-25 (2002).
71. See infra Part IV.B.2.
72. See Stephan Wilske & Todd J. Fox, The So-Called ‘Judicial Hellholes’ in
US Jurisdictions and Possible Means to Avoid Them, 2 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 235,
235, 239-40 (2008); AMERICAN TORT REFORM FOUNDATION (ATRF), JUDICIAL
HELLHOLES (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.judicialhellholes.org.
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courts and lawmakers in these jurisdictions are not entirely
clear. However, there are allegations that the objective of
benefiting the local plaintiffs’ bar at the expense of out-ofstate corporate defendants plays a role, particularly in states
where judges are elected by the general population and must
rely on donations for their electoral campaigns.73 Because
local practitioners are the prime contributors to campaigns
for judicial office, they represent the constituency of the
judges. Given that local attorneys derive a substantial share
of their revenues from contingency fees earned in lawsuits
brought against out-of-state corporations it is not
unimaginable that the local judiciary is responsive to its
interest in generous standards for attributing liability and
awarding damages. With a view to the State of Mississippi a
federal judge of the Fifth Circuit noted explicitly that “its
courts have become a Mecca for plaintiffs’ claims against outof-state businesses.”74
Such characterizations are not uncontroversial as
commentators have criticized the surveys underlying the
reports on judicial hellholes as seriously flawed.75 For present
purposes, it is not necessary to take sides in this controversy,
as it suffices to find variation between the courts of different
jurisdictions, together with evidence suggesting that the
differences are not a matter of happenstance but of deliberate
actions of decision-makers. As to the first point of variation
73. See the statement of Judge Richard Neely of West Virginia in RICHARD
NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: HOW BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM THE
POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 4 (1988) (“The anarchy that currently prevails among
American state jurisdictions absolutely guarantees politically that no line of any
sort will be drawn. After all, I’m not the only appellate judge who wants to sleep
at night. As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state
companies to in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep
enhanced when I give someone else’s money away, but so is my job security,
because the in-state plaintiffs, their families and their friends will reelect me.”).
74. Arnold v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 277 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 2001).
75. See Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey:
Inaccurate, Unfair, and Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 969, 98385 (2009); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L.
REV. 1093, at 1103-05 (1996); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 901, 916-17 (2011); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System–and Why Not?, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1992).
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between courts, there is no reasonable doubt that there are
“magnet” jurisdictions attracting a disproportionate number
of personal injury suits in general, and of large, aggregated
cases in particular. The reason for the gravitational pull
exerted by these jurisdictions must be that the expected
judgment for plaintiffs is higher than elsewhere.76 This is
confirmed by a recent survey of blockbuster punitive
damages awards, i.e. awards exceeding $100 million in
nominal dollars. The study found that 41 of the 99 highest
punitive damages awards in history were awarded by courts
in just two states—California and Texas—while New York’s
courts rendered only 2 such awards.77 For each citizen, the
average amount of such blockbuster awards in 2008 dollars
was $136 in New York, $629 in Texas and $1,429 in
California.78
For obvious reasons, the motives of judges sitting in such
magnet jurisdictions are difficult to investigate. A famous
member of the plaintiffs’ bar in Mississippi characterized his
state as a “magic jurisdiction” where the judiciary was
elected with “verdict money” so that it was almost impossible
for out-of-state defendants to get a fair trial.79 This suggests
that the motive behind plaintiff-friendly decisions may really
76. Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come
to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 190 (2009) (“The post-Shutts [Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)] world, however, allowed each local jurisdiction
to test its experimental regime not within its geographic boundaries, but
wherever similarly situated claimants might happen to be found. Once we add
differences in local rules governing aggregation, different legal cultures across the
range of potential jurisdictions, the possibility of untoward influence with locally
elected judges in some locales, and a range of other such experimental variables,
the potential for strategic manipulation of forum becomes ever present. The
results were repeated criticisms, some no doubt well founded, of certain choice
places being a ‘magnet forum’ or, less benignly, a ‘judicial hellhole’ for the
ensnared defendant.”).
77. Alison F. Del Rossi & W. Kip Viscusi, The Changing Landscape of
Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 130 (2010).
78. Id.
79. The citation is ascribed to Richard Scruggs, in The Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, Asbestos for Lunch 5, (June 11, 2002), cited in Mark A. Behrens & Cary
Silverman, Now Open for Business: The Transformation of Mississippi’s Legal
Climate, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 393, 394 (2005); see also Benjamin Reid et al., Tobacco
Lawyers’ Roundtable: A Report from the Front Lines, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 543, 545
(2001).
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be the desire to attract claims. But even if this were
otherwise, the suggestion that a demand side responsive to
the plaintiffs’ interests does exist may still hold water. Even
if every single judge is solely motivated by the honest motive
to apply the law, the perception as to what the law says and
requires will differ between judges. The motive of plaintifffriendly judges to further the interests of victims, for
example, may lead to judgments that are indistinguishable
from outcomes reached by judges who act on the desire to
attract claims. For a competitive process to unfold, it does not
matter what the underlying motive is as long as courts differ
systematically in their attitudes towards plaintiffs so that
one court consistently performs better in the eyes of plaintiffs
than another. Competition for a plaintiff-friendly court will
develop where there is variance between the courts and
jurisdictions.
F. Is Unilateral Competition Desirable?
Even though the striving of plaintiffs for the court most
conducive to their cause may be couched in the terms of
competition, it is not the kind of competition economists
envisage for an efficient economy and society, as it does not
maximize social welfare. From a normative point of view,
unilateral competition is a failure because the interplay of
supply and demand does not promote social welfare. The
outcome cannot be otherwise as the private welfare function
of the plaintiff is different from the social welfare function.
While plaintiffs care about the prospect of winning, the social
welfare function is based not on the number of successful
suits but on optimal enforcement of the incentive structure
created by the substantive law of contract or by the parties
in their agreements.80 Where the good to be maximized is the
number of successful suits brought, competition will force
courts and lawmakers to treat plaintiffs ever more favorably.
A court that would just rubber-stamp the suits filed, and
award judgment for plaintiff without any further ado, would
be the most desirable because it produced the most output at
the least cost.

80. See infra Part IV.A.4.
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Within the realm of dispute resolution, the pursuit of
plaintiff’s self-interest does not, through the working of the
invisible hand, promote social welfare, but rather sets off a
race to the bottom.81 The general presumption that pursuit of
individualistic goals furthers the common good does not hold
where the counterpart at the other end of the transaction
fails do to the same and is willing instead to accommodate
the first parties’ interests at the expense of third parties. This
is exactly what is happening in the realm of unilateral
competition for judicial services; plaintiffs want to win,
courts that are friendly to their interests follow suit, and the
balance must be paid by defendants who, in the extreme, are
being denied their right to a fair trial.
This general feature that renders unilateral competition
for judicial services undesirable may be present in other
areas of legal administration as well. With regard to the
competition of states for corporate charters, it is a matter of
some dispute whether that race is headed towards the bottom
or rather to the top, i.e. competition for a corporate law that
helps to maximize social welfare.82 This is a valid question to
ask, as the decision to incorporate or reincorporate in one
state rather than another is often not made by the owners of
the corporation but by the management. To the extent that
the interests of managers differ from those of the
shareholders, competition for corporate charters may lead to
suboptimal outcomes. However, this discussion cannot be
taken up in the present context, as there are major factors
working to rein in unilateral competition in the market for
corporate charters, such as the involvement of the SEC and
the control of management by shareholders and capital
markets. Such controls are absent from the market for
judicial services.
The closest real-world analogy to unilateral competition
in the market for dispute resolution may be the competition
of firms for the most favorable bankruptcy forum. Here, too,
it has been argued that allowing corporations to choose the
bankruptcy court overseeing the reorganization has
81. See sources cited supra note 17.
82. See supra note 15 and accompanying sources.
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corrupted the bankruptcy system to the benefit of those who
make these choices, i.e. the incumbent management of
insolvent companies.83 The race to the bottom competition
that resulted from unilateral choice of the bankruptcy forum
has favored those courts that adopted a passive attitude,
rubber-stamping management’s proposals regarding asset
sales, critical vendor lists, and prepackaged plans.84
IV. BILATERAL COMPETITION FOR OPTIMAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
As we have seen, in a model of unilateral forum choice,
the incentives faced by the plaintiff will lead her to choose
the court where her chances of prevailing and of securing a
high award are maximized and the expected costs of dispute
resolution to be borne by the plaintiff are minimized.85
Bilateral competition will lead to different outcomes because
the interests and incentives of both parties, rather than only
the plaintiff’s, enter the equation.
A. The Demand Side: Shared Interests of the Parties
What are the incentives that lead the parties in making
their choice between one court and another in the situation
ex ante? Given that a plaintiff wants to maximize the
expected payoff from litigation, one might be tempted to
think that the parties will want to maximize their joint profit
from litigation, in terms of maximizing the size of the award.
This proposition is wrong. It implies that the parties seek to
reap the benefit of their bargain in the form of sums awarded
in court judgments rendered down the road, after a dispute
has arisen and has been resolved through litigation. Because
litigation is a zero-sum game that causes costs, delay and
collateral harm, maximizing the number of disputes does not
maximize the parties’ joint surplus from their contract but
rather harms their interests.

83. See supra note 16 and accompanying sources.
84. See LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 16, at 137 (citing attorney M.
Blake Cleary of the firm Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor).
85. E.g., supra Part III.B.
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1. Accurate Enforcement—Efficient Predispute
Behavior
In the situation ex ante, it is in the interest of both
parties to maximize the joint benefit from their contract. In
an ideal world, the parties would write a completely specified
contract that covers every contingency and set up an
incentive scheme that induces behavior that maximizes the
joint surplus.86 The same could be achieved by limiting
express contractual language to specific issues only and to
rely on default rules for the rest—provided that these default
rules promoted efficient solutions. Under the assumption
that the parties’ contract or any composite of contract
provisions and default rules generates incentives which
induce behavior that maximizes the pie, and therefore leads
to an efficient allocation of resources, the proper function of
the courts is to enforce the parties’ bargain. An efficient
contract will only lead to efficient behavior if breaches of
contract are sanctioned by a court imposing the proper
remedy, e.g. expectation damages.87 The court provides the
enforcement mechanism that makes the incentives set up by
contract or by law sharp. In absence of this enforcement
mechanism, the parties would have no legal incentive to
comply with the obligations they assumed under the
contract. They would resort to self-help remedies, which
must be costlier than the civil justice system as otherwise the
parties would use them anyway.
While it is obvious that false negatives, i.e. the rejection
of valid claims for damages based on breach of contract,
undermine the incentives to perform rather than breach, the
same has been shown to be true for false positives. If a court
grants a claim for damages even though the defendant was
not in breach, incentives to perform will be weakened, not

86. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 292, 339-41
(2004) [hereinafter SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS].
87. Even though matters are far more complicated, expectation damages are
the proper remedy for breach of contract in many standard cases. See id. at 30409.
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strengthened.88 For a party facing the decision to perform or
breach, the crucial yardstick is not the absolute probability
of being held liable in case of breach, but the difference
between the expected sanction in case of breach and the
expected sanction in case of performance. If a court awarded
damages for breach of contract randomly, i.e. with a
probability of 0.5 regardless of whether there really was a
breach, the expected sanction would not influence the parties’
behavior at all. Because it would not make a difference in
court whether the promisor performed or breached, she
would have no financial incentive not to breach where her
private gain exceeded her private costs.
In a similar vein, one could imagine that efficient
enforcement of contractual obligations requires a court to
award damages for breach of contract in the largest
conceivable amount. Such a view is mistaken as well.
Damages in excess of expectation damages, for example,
undermine the incentives the expectation damages remedy is
designed to generate.89 A court that awarded damages
greater than losses would create incentives to perform on a
contract even where it would be more efficient not to do so,
as the costs of performance incurred by the promisor would
exceed the harm suffered by the promisee in case of breach.
As much as the parties who negotiate a contract have no
reason to increase the damage measure beyond expectation
damages, there is no reason for them to pick a court that is
likely to impose a supra-compensatory remedy.
Rational parties to a contract are interested in putting
into practice the incentive scheme established in their
contract, i.e. induce behavior such as delivery of the goods
and performance of the services that were promised,
payment of the price, etc., where this is the efficient thing to
do. They have no interest in anything more or less.
88. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic
Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 348 (1994); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-3 (1994).
89. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 150-55 (8th ed. 2011)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of
Contract, Damages Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273,
284-86 (1970); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL
J. ECON., 466, 470-72, 487 (1980).
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Consequently, the dispute resolution mechanism of their
choice would enforce the provisions of their bargain and of
efficient default rules accurately. In doing so, it would deter
inefficient behavior and create incentives to maximize the
joint gains from the contract. Therefore, the demand of the
parties in the situation ex ante is for an accurate court or
tribunal. Disregarding costs for the moment, this means a
court that allows only valid claims in the amount warranted
and rejects all invalid claims.
The answer to the question as to what the parties
maximize when they negotiate a forum selection or
arbitration clause ex ante is therefore straightforward: they
maximize the gains from trade in the form of inducements to
comply with efficient terms in their contract.90 Other than in
the situation ex post, the behavior of the parties, e.g., the
decision whether to take precautions that make performance
more likely or not to do so and instead prepare for breach, is
not a fact of the past, but involves options for future actions.
The court or tribunal chosen by the parties defines the payoff
that will be derived from the choice of one of these options,
e.g. breaching the contract, by imposing a monetary sanction.
It is essential to bear in mind that the gains from
enforcement of efficient contracts, in the form identified
above, may only be reaped in the course of the execution of
the contract and before a dispute has even arisen. Once the
act that the contract was designed to deter has been
committed, e.g. once the promise to perform has been broken,
accuracy becomes irrelevant for the parties. Of course, the
judgment of the competent decision-maker affects the
distribution of wealth between the parties, which explains
why they compete for the court most favorable to their
interests.91 However, any gains from efficient pre-dispute
behavior have already been lost. In case the promisor expects
90. See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 745-47 (2001) [hereinafter Drahozal, Unfair Clauses]; Keith
N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis,
8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 218-19 (2000); Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social
Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1986); Steven Shavell, The Social
Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11. J. LEGAL
STUD. 333 (1982).
91. See supra Part III.B.D.
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to get away in court even though his decision to breach the
contract was opportunistic, i.e. performance would have been
the course of action maximizing the pie, he will commit the
breach. After the contract has been breached
opportunistically, the losses incurred as a consequence
thereof are sunk costs that cannot be avoided or retrieved by
an accurate decision ex post. In the world ex post, accurate
decisions are important only as guideposts for future parties,
similarly situated, who are informed about the sanction to be
expected in case of opportunistic breach.92 For the parties to
the present dispute, this positive externality remains
irrelevant. However, in the world ex ante, when the present
disputants agreed on the court or tribunal competent to hear
and decide disputes of the future, they were able to anticipate
the size of the possible sanction and the probability that it
will be imposed in case—and only in case—of an
opportunistic breach. Therefore, any gains from an optimal
decision-making process that may accrue to the present
disputants are predicated on the assumption that the parties,
at the time of contracting, know about the level of accuracy
supplied by the decision-maker of their choice.93 It is only
then that they are in a position to reap the benefits of
accuracy in the form of better incentives to take care and to
facilitate performance.
Achieving the goal of accurate enforcement of contractual
agreements is not a one-way street where the parties focus
on the substantive provisions first and then turn to the
dispute resolution clause in order to identify the court best
able to enforce their bargain. The two issues of contract
drafting and enforcement are intertwined since better
drafting may reduce the demands for the courts that are
called upon to enforce the contract when a dispute arises in
the future.94 If the parties were able to write an unequivocal
contract that no reasonable decision-maker could ever
92. See infra Part V.C.1.
93. See Louis Kaplow, Accuracy in Adjudication, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 24, at 2.
94. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of
Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 517, 523-24 (2008); Robert E. Scott &
George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L. J. 814,
817-18, 830 (2006).
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misconstrue, their only concern would be to avoid a corrupt
court. In reality, however, it is impossible to draft complete
and unequivocal contracts, which is another way of saying
that drafting complete contracts would involve transaction
costs that would outweigh the gains made from completeness
in the form of benefits from added accuracy. Thus, the parties
need to balance the investments made in more accurate
contract drafting against the costs of dispute resolution to be
expected down the road. The higher the costs of drafting more
precise contract language and the lower the costs of accurate
judicial enforcement, the more the parties will want to rely
on the judicial process rather than run up transaction costs
in the process of negotiating their contract.
2. Enforcement of Judgments
The concern of rational contract parties is not with
accurate decisions as such, in the form of a nicely reasoned
document created by a court.95 In reality, the dispute may be
far from over after judgment has been rendered. This is not
because appeals may be available, as appellate procedures
are meant to enhance accuracy given a certain budget of
administrative funds and resources.96 Sure enough, the
common interest in accuracy must be targeted at the final
judgment in a given case with the design and performance of
the appeals process taken into account.
From the perspective of the parties ex ante, the gains
from accuracy are based on incentives to behave properly, e.g.
to render performance rather than to breach a contract where
this is the efficient course of conduct. In order to provide the
appropriate incentives to do so, the promisor must be
confronted with a credible sanction. In case of breach, a
credible sanction requires not only that the court would
recognize it as such—and award the remedies stipulated in
the contract or supplied by legal default rules —but also that,
in cases where the losing defendant does not comply
voluntarily, the judgment will be enforced against him by the
competent authorities. Only if the defendant can be certain
95. But cf. supra note 88 and accompanying sources.
96. See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24
J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995) [hereinafter Shavell, Error Correction].

1124

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

that, in the case of non-performance, a court will hold him in
breach, award expectation damages to the plaintiff, and
collect by force the sum awarded plus costs and interest, does
the defendant face the right incentives to make the decision
to either perform or breach.
Assuming by way of illustration that the expectation
interest of the plaintiff-promisee is 100 and the costs of
performance to the promisor are 90, efficiency requires that
the contract be performed. The defendant-promisor will do so
if he can be certain that, in case of non-performance, the court
will accurately hold him in breach of contract, enter a
judgment in the amount of 100, and force him to pay this sum
to the plaintiff in the course of execution. However, if the
probability for the plaintiff-promisor to prevail in a suit for
breach of contract was only 85%, the expected judgment
would be worth 85, which is less than the cost of performance.
As a consequence, the defendant has no incentive to perform
instead of committing breach, even though breach is not
desirable from a social point of view. The same inefficient
result would be obtained if the court ruled accurately on the
merits and awarded damages in the amount of 100, but
where the probability of recovery in execution was only 85%.
In well-organized jurisdictions, execution of judgments is
assured so that the only concern about collectability is
whether the defendant is solvent, i.e. has assets sufficient to
cover the sum awarded in judgment. The choice of venue or
the one between arbitration and litigation can do very little
about judgment-proof defendants, even though the effects of
asset limitations on incentives to take care and not to breach
contracts are serious and well known.97 This is different in
the international context, where picking the right court may
pave the way towards full recovery in execution, while a
favorable judgment rendered by the “wrong” forum may
prove to be worthless. This is why practitioners specialized
in international litigation select the forum with a view to
making recovery in execution more likely. The same concern
explains why arbitration is so successful in the market for
resolution of international disputes: arbitral awards enjoy a
97. Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45,
45-46, 54 (1986).
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privilege over court judgments when it comes to recognition
and enforcement abroad. Only arbitral awards are subject to
the uniform regime of the New York Convention of 1958,98
while the recognition and enforcement of a judgment of a
foreign court remains in the discretion of the lawmakers and
judges in the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought.
During the last decade, efforts were made to remedy this
situation under the purview of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law. The goal was to supplement the
New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards by a sister convention, which would
govern jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments.99 Due to deep differences in opinion
between the governments of the U.S. and Europe on how to
allocate personal jurisdiction in the international arena, this
attempt failed rather spectacularly. The final outcome was
not a proposal for a convention covering the two topics of
jurisdiction and enforcement, but rather a narrow
instrument dealing with forum selection clauses only.100 The
effort made at the Hague Convention provides evidence of
how large issues of enforcement and collectability loom in
international transactions. The Hague Convention on Choice
of Court Clauses at least provides the parties with a device
to fix jurisdiction by agreement and to safeguard
enforcement of judgments rendered by the court of their
choice. In doing so, it places litigation based on consensual
forum selection on an equal footing with arbitration that is
based on agreements to arbitrate. This helps to stimulate
bilateral competition for the best system of dispute resolution
across the litigation/arbitration divide.
98. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
99. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International
Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-wide: Can
the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 191, 193-94, 200 (2001);
Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A
New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 271-73
(1994); CATHERINE KESSEDJIAN, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS
IN
CIVIL
AND
COMMERCIAL
MATTERS
(1997),
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd7.pdf.
100. See Andrea Schulz, The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Clauses,
12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 433 (2006).

1126

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

3. The Tradeoff Between Accuracy and Costs
It would be wrong to think that rational parties would be
interested in maximizing the accuracy of outcomes in
litigation. Looking back at the variables that determine the
unilateral decisions made by plaintiffs, the administrative
costs of dispute resolution remain a concern here as well.
However, while the plaintiff, when acting unilaterally, only
cares about the expected cost to her, the parties together
share the interest to limit and minimize the joint cost of
litigation.
There is a tradeoff between accuracy and costs in the
sense that accuracy is increased when greater resources are
spent on litigation.101 Thus, the efficient outcome involves an
exercise in balancing the gains from accuracy against its
costs. One way to formulate the rule is that the parties should
choose the dispute resolution mechanism that maximizes the
difference between deterrence benefits and dispute
resolution costs.102 It makes no difference, but is easier to put
into mathematical terms, to turn the calculus around and to
target the minimization of the sum of administrative and
error costs: min cja + c(e).103 It is essential to bear in mind that,
other than in the case of administrative costs, the costs of
error (c(e)) are incurred not in the course of litigation or
thereafter but ex ante, before a dispute arises.104 The costs of
error come in the currency of distorted incentives to behave
efficiently, i.e. to comply with an efficient rule or contractual
provision.
As in the case of unilateral competition, an analysis
focusing only on the administrative costs of dispute
resolution is too narrow. In addition to these, the loss to the
plaintiff caused by the delay in dispute resolution and any
collateral harm incurred by both parties in the course of the
101. See Hylton, supra note 90, at 213; Kaplow, supra note 88, at 348-54; Spier,
supra note 48, at 283.
102. Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation
and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549,
550 (2003).
103. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 417 (5th ed. 2008).
104. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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process must be taken into account. Applying the
nomenclature used above, the complete formula would read:
min c(e) + cja + cjd + Zj.105 In the real world, the parties will not
strive to devise the forum that minimizes the outcome of this
formula, but rather compare one court to another in order to
identify the superior forum, i.e. the one that performs better
in balancing accuracy and costs. Given a choice between
Court 1 and Court 2, the parties will prefer Court 1 if c(e1) +
cja1 + cjd1 + Zj1 < c(e2) + cj2 + cjd2 + Zj2 and vice versa.
The objective to minimize the sum of error costs,
administrative costs, costs of delay, and collateral harm will
lead rational parties to make a joint and reasoned choice
between different courts or other mechanisms of dispute
resolution. It is just another way of maximizing the pie, one
where the pie allows for the possibility of disputes and
therefore includes the costs of dispute resolution.
4. Alignment of the Private and the Social Interest
Disregarding externalities,106 parties maximizing the
contractual pie maximize social welfare at the same time.
Therefore, the same calculus can be applied by the courts: a
court should increase its efforts for accuracy up to the point
where the cost of a marginal increase in administrative
expenses is equal to the benefits in terms of the gains from
more efficient performance of contractual obligations.
Because the benefits associated with more accurate
enforcement of the law depend on the foreseeability of the
court’s ultimate decision for the parties ex ante, they will
vary with context. Where the gain from more accurate
adjudication is small or even non-existent, as may be the case
with quantum issues where parties are only able to foresee
average harm, the court should refrain from investing its

105. It must be borne in mind that Z captures not only collateral harm but also
collateral gain, as outlined above in Part III. C. 2., and may therefore be either
positive or negative. Should the aggregation of collateral costs and collateral
benefits represented in Z lead to a negative value (meaning that in total a
collateral gain is given) the formula must read: min c(e) + cja + cjd − Zj.
106. See infra Part V.C.
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resources in order to achieve a higher level of accuracy.107
B. The Supply Side: Incentives of Judges, Lawmakers, and
Arbitrators
In the previous section, it has been pointed out that there
is a demand for an optimal court in the sense of a dispute
resolution mechanism that maximizes the difference between
the gains from more efficient behavior due to the threat of
accurate enforcement of efficient rules and agreements, and
the administrative and collateral costs of whatever dispute
resolution mechanism the parties chose. The analysis now
turns to the supply side of the market. The fact that there is
a demand for an optimal court would remain inconsequential
if it did not meet a supply side that was responsive to this
demand.
1. The Price of Judicial Services
An initial problem with framing the choice between
courts in parallel to a transaction in an ordinary services
market is that a market price for judicial services does not
exist. Judicial services are not priced in proportion to cost so
that supply and demand can never reach a competitive
equilibrium that maximizes social welfare. Courts typically
charge only nominal fees for their services that fall far short
of covering the full costs of the civil justice system. The larger
share of these costs is shouldered by the government and
ultimately by the taxpayer as the funder of public
infrastructure. Regardless of the absolute level of the fees
charged, no court sets its fees in proportion to the amount of
judicial sweat that goes into resolving a particular claim.
Fees are not even meant to serve as an equivalent or at least
an approximation of market prices.
2. Judges’ Incentives
The shape and outcomes of competition in the market for
judicial services depends on the behavior of the judges, which
107. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of
Damages, 39 J. L. & ECON. 191 (1996) (demonstrating that accuracy in the
calculation of damages may not be worthwhile in many settings).
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in turn is a function of their incentives. While the processes
for the selection of judges vary greatly across jurisdictions,
no jurisdiction subjects judges to selection by the potential
disputants, i.e. by the firms and individuals who have become
their “clients.” Once judges have been appointed, they are not
paid in proportion to the effort they invest in a given case, let
alone that their income reflected whether they did a good or
a poor job on the cases assigned to them. Other than in the
days of Adam Smith, who described the English courts of the
18th century,108 judges are no longer paid out of the fees paid
into their court by the litigants. Rather, they operate within
a framework of constitutional and administrative law that
insulates them from the forces of the market. In such an
environment, judges do not have a financial incentive to
increase demand for their services. Therefore, it is
unwarranted to characterize their practice as one of “selling”
the service of dispute resolution in a competitive market.
However, in a more modest way that does not aim for
allocative efficiency through the operation of perfectly
competitive markets, it remains legitimate to think of the
judiciary as forming the supply side in a market for dispute
resolution services. Even though judges have no financial
motive to provide work of high quality, they care about both
popularity and prestige. They want to be respected for their
abilities by the public at large and by their peer groups
including fellow judges and members of the bar.109 This
incentive is particularly strong in jurisdictions where judges
are recruited from the ranks of the bar. In these jurisdictions,
the peer group of judges continues to be their former
colleagues. In England, for instance, the newly appointed
judges remain members of the barrister chambers in which
they had been working with their colleagues before their calls
to the bench. These judges will be concerned about the
reputation they continue to enjoy among their former
108. See 1 SMITH, supra note 23.
109. See Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB.
CHOICE 107, 129 (1983); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices
Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 1315 (1993) [hereinafter Posner, Judges and Justices]; cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW
JUDGES THINK 35-40 (2008).
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brothers-in-arms. These non-pecuniary goals do entice judges
to work much harder than they would have to in order keep
their offices. In addition, judges have an incentive to avoid
the reversal of their decisions by appellate courts, if only
because they enjoy the power to decide what is wrong and
what is right.110
More detailed findings would depend on a thorough
exploration of the incentive structure faced by judges, and
they would vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, in
accordance with the variance in procedures for judicial
appointments, rules on tenure and salary, working hours,
promotion, independence, etc. As a general proposition it still
seems plausible to assume that judges have an interest in
deciding challenging and important cases, and in doing this
in a way that supports a good reputation among their peers.
In a loose sense, therefore, there is competition between
individual judges as well as between courts and jurisdictions.
3. Lawmakers’ Incentives
Judges are not the only actors on the supply side of the
market for dispute resolution. Lawmakers are another group
whose actions and omissions bear on the quality of dispute
resolution services available in a given jurisdiction.
Consciously or not, judges and legislators are working
together to define the product of judicial dispute resolution
as it is offered in a particular locale. In many jurisdictions,
the fees charged by courts for the filing and processing of
claims are set not by the judiciary, but by the legislature.
Often, the legislature also enacts the rules of procedure and
determines the size and the organization of the judiciary. In
some jurisdictions, legislative committees vote judges into
office so that the legislature also determines the composition
of the judiciary. It is obvious that these decisions bear heavily
on the performance of the court system.111
A complete picture of the market for judicial services
therefore has to include the members of the legislature and
would need to analyze their incentives. This is easier said
than done as it requires an exploration into the incentive
110. See Posner, Judges and Justices, supra note 109, at 15-23.
111. See supra Part III.E.
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structure of individual members of the legislature, the
aggregation of these incentives into a majority position, a
model explaining the interaction of the legislative majority
with the executive branch, and finally an idea of how the
executive branch forms preferences and acts upon them.
While it is impossible to develop a theory of legislative
behavior in the present context,112 it remains possible to
explore reasonable hypotheses with regard to the subject
matter under consideration. The pivotal question is whether
lawmakers have an interest in making their jurisdiction
attractive to those parties who are considering it as the
jurisdiction of their choice.
The answer is in the affirmative. Even without assuming
any preferences regarding the substance of the legal rules in
force in a given jurisdiction, lawmakers will take an interest
in the enforcement of whichever rules they put in place. Law
enforcement, in the sense of applying the law made by the
legislature to the facts they were meant to govern, is foremost
the business of the courts. Quite obviously, the domestic
courts offer the greatest assurance that the domestic law will
be applied properly. This explains the tendency of states and
countries to extend the jurisdiction of their courts as far as
possible through long-arm statutes or other tools.113
In addition, lawmakers take an interest in the well-being
of the local bar. Either de facto or de jure, lawyers are
restricted to a single jurisdiction or a small number of
jurisdictions. This means that litigators depend for their fee
revenue on the business of the local courts. If the local courts
remain idle, the income of litigators declines. This explains
why lawyers in general, and those working in litigation
departments in particular, have a strong interest in keeping
their courts busy. In a legal environment that allows the
disputants to opt out of a particular jurisdiction through a
forum selection or arbitration clause, lawyers cannot force
contracting parties into their courts. Rather, they must see
to it that the local courts are attractive enough not to drive
parties away and even to attract more litigants. But why
112. For an overview, see POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 89, at 71620. For a more elaborate treatment, see ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC
CONSTITUTION 15-78 (2000).
113. See supra Part III.D.
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should a legislature accommodate this concern? Part of the
answer lies in the fact that legal work is a professional
service that generates substantial revenues for local
suppliers. Lawmakers have an interest in keeping those
revenues within “their” economy, and to export them by
attracting demand from elsewhere. The well-being and
growth of the legal industry keeps voters working in law
firms happy, it has positive spill-over effects for other local
suppliers such as restaurants and hotels, but also for sellers
of real estate and office space, and it contributes directly to
the public budget in the form of tax revenues.
In addition to these beneficial effects for the local
economy, there is also a public-choice story to be told, as
lawyers are a small group with well-aligned and well-defined
interests that have proven to be more successful in the
political arena than large groups with conflicting and illdefined interests.114 This effect is particularly pronounced in
the case of attorneys because they tend to control the
legislature’s judicial committee, where the important
decisions in matters relating to legal services are made.
There is empirical evidence that litigators have indeed
managed to voice their interests quite powerfully and to
advertise their domestic justice system as particularly
“competitive.”115
4. Arbitrators, Arbitration Institutions, and the
Framers of Arbitration Acts
Arbitration is an easy case for competition in the market
for dispute resolution services because the supply side is
composed of self-interested individuals and institutions that
offer their services on a private market.116 In analyzing the
supply side of the market for arbitration it is important not
114. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 22-36 (1965).
115. THE LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, ENGLAND AND WALES:
JURISDICTION OF CHOICE (2007), sponsored by the law firms of Herbert Smith,
Norton
Rose
and
Eversheds,
available
at
https://www.haitzrechtsanwaelte.de/de/newsarchiv/data/aktuelles__4_2.pdf.
116. Cf. Peter B. Rutlege, Toward a Contractual Approach for Arbitral
Immunity, 39 GA. L. REV. 151, 161-65 (2004) (“These markets for dispute
resolution services (both domestic and international) are marked by fierce
competition among suppliers.”).
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to focus exclusively on the arbitrators as individuals and to
view them as the only competitors of judges sitting in courts
of law. Rather, the market for arbitration includes arbitral
institutions that offer the service of administering arbitral
proceedings and serve as intermediaries between the
disputants and individual arbitrators ready to accept
appointments to tribunals. A recent empirical survey has
found that 86% of the awards rendered by arbitral tribunals
were made within proceedings administered by an
arbitration institution, while the remaining 14% were
rendered in ad hoc arbitrations which involve no institution
but only a freelance tribunal.117 Thus, one must expect
competition to unfold on three dimensions, namely between
individual arbitrators, between arbitration institutions, and
finally between the world of arbitration (i.e. institutions and
individuals taken together on the one side) and the public
courts whose jurisdiction may be derogated on the other.
Any doubts that competition between arbitral
institutions such as the AAA,118 JAMS,119 ICC,120 and LCIA121
actually exists are immediately dispelled by a glance at their
websites where the institutions advertise their services in
the same manner as other profit-making organizations do.122
Intensive competition characterizes the market for
individual arbitrators too. Practitioners and academics alike
compete for lucrative appointments in the arbitration market
by participating in conferences, publishing books and articles
117. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE
ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 15 (Queen Mary Univ. of London, ed. 2008), available
at http://pwc.co.uk/en_UK/uk/assets/pdf/pwc-international-arbitration-2008.pdf.
118. American Arbitration Association, http://www.adr.org (last visited Aug. 28,
2014).
119. The registered name is “JAMS—The Resolution Experts.” Originally,
JAMS was an acronym for Judicial Arbitration and Mediation services. See
http://www.jamsadr.com/about-the-jams-name (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).
120. International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration,
http://www.iccwbo.org/court (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).
121. The London Court of International Arbitration, http://www.lcia.org (last
visited Aug. 28, 2014).
122. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 117, at 15 (listing the shares
of the different arbitration institutions of the global market of international
arbitration).
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on arbitration, and trying to build up a reputation by serving
on tribunals in a way that they hope the parties will
appreciate.123
There is also evidence of competition between
jurisdictions to attract arbitral proceedings, i.e. arbitrations
that are conducted in one particular jurisdiction rather than
another.124 It is no secret that the major jurisdictions serving
as seats for international arbitrations, particularly England,
France, and Switzerland, are eager to outperform each other.
To this end, none of the “big three” resolved to adopt
UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration,125 as such a move would bite off any competitive
edge that the English, French or Swiss laws of arbitration
may have, or be perceived to have, over their competitors.
France and Switzerland even went as far as to enact special
rules for international arbitrations, which differ from the
legal framework that applies to arbitrating domestic
disputes.126 The separation of the law of arbitration into two
distinct areas carries the respective legislature’s intention of
attracting international arbitrations on its face.

123. Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of
Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 52 (1999).
124. KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 6 (1993);
Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitrator Selection and Regulatory Competition in
International Arbitration Law, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 167, 174 (Christopher R. Drahozal
& Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005); Christopher R. Drahozal, Regulatory
Competition and the Location of International Arbitration Proceedings, 24 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 371, 373 (2004).
125. United Nations, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION (1994), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/
arbitration/ml-arb/06-54671_Ebook.pdf.
126. The motives underlying this split are rarely explained in public. Cf. JEANFRANÇOIS POUDRET & SÉBASTIAN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, 25-28 (Stephen V. Berti & Annette Ponti trans., 2007).
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C. Evidence of Competition Between Adjudication and
Arbitration
1. Claims and Empirical Findings
Within the literature on arbitration, it is commonly
taken for granted that arbitration clauses are a staple in
commercial contracts and that hardly any business makes do
without them.127 This claim must be too strong, however, as
it cannot explain why courts are still busy resolving
commercial cases. The proposition that arbitration is
superior to litigation is impossible to confirm or refute, as
empirical research is particularly difficult in this area. Even
though arbitral institutions publish statistics, these do not
include the number of ad-hoc arbitrations that remain in the
dark. In addition, knowledge of the number of cases resolved
in arbitration has little informational value as long as the
total number of disputes, including those that are never filed
with a court or arbitral institution, but are resolved by way
of negotiation, mediation, and other forms of alternative
dispute resolution, remains unknown.128
These cautionary remarks are confirmed by a recent
empirical survey conducted by Eisenberg and Miller of
contracts filed with the SEC. Their research revealed that
only 20% of international contracts, and no more than 11% of
domestic contracts, included arbitration clauses.129 A
European study on the choice of dispute resolution
127. Cf. REDFERN & HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, ¶ 1.01 (5th ed.
2009) (“International Arbitration has become the principal method of resolving
disputes between States, individuals, and corporations in almost every aspect of
international trade, commerce, and investment.”).
128. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration by the Numbers: The State of
Empirical Research on International Commercial Arbitration, 22 ARB. INT’L 291,
294-95 (2006).
129. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held
Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Flight
from Arbitration]. For a critique of this study, arguing that the flight from
arbitration does not happen, see Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware,
Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 433, 446-76 (2010).
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mechanisms in cross-border transactions based on telephone
interviews with one hundred businesses suggests that, in
Europe, the demand for arbitration is higher. 63% of
respondents said that they preferred arbitration to litigation
in court.130
These findings should not come as a surprise. As has
been explored above, the choice between different
mechanisms of dispute resolution involves a range of complex
variables. In making the choice between arbitration and
litigation, the parties must compare the efficiency gains from
the accurate enforcement of the incentive structure set up in
their contract with the sum of administrative costs, losses
from delay, collateral harm with respect to both, and the
performance of a hypothetical tribunal and of the competent
court. The better the performance of the judicial system
within the dimensions of accuracy, administrative cost,
delay, and collateral harm, the more favorably it compares to
arbitration. Given the variation between jurisdictions, it
would be surprising if the results were homogenous.
2. International Arbitration
The empirical study cited above confirms the unanimous
view that arbitration clauses are more popular in
international transactions than in domestic ones.131 Parties
are averse to litigating in the courts of their respective
opponents for fear of judicial bias132 and in order to avoid the
use of a foreign language, the retention of foreign counsel,
and many other inconveniences that reduce the party’s
chance of winning in a foreign court. In the international
context, arbitration is the only way to secure a truly neutral
decision-maker and to thus provide for accuracy in decision-

130. STEFAN VOGENAUER & CHRISTOPHER HODGES, CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN
EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHOICE OF FORUM AND CHOICE OF CONTRACT LAW 45
(2008), available at http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/iecl/pdfs/Oxford%20Civil%
20Justice%20Survey%20-%20Summary%20of%20Results,%20Final.pdf.
131. See Eisenberg & Miller, Flight from Arbitration, supra note 129, at 341-42.
132. See supra Part III.D.1. But see Eisenberg & Miller, Flight from Arbitration,
supra note 129, at 341-42 (doubting that any such bias exists in American courts).
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making and the resulting incentives for welfare-enhancing
behavior.
A related point that has already been mentioned is the
privilege arbitral awards enjoy in the area of cross-border
enforcement.133 Even if one compares international
arbitration to litigation in the best public court available in
terms of even-handedness and accuracy, arbitration has an
inherent advantage, as arbitral awards are easily enforceable
across borders under the New York Convention, whereas
judgments of public courts are not.
3. Domestic Arbitration
Within the context of domestic disputes, enforceability of
judicial decisions is assured, and the need to avoid a biased
or even hostile decision-maker is much weaker. But still, a
substantial number of disputants choose arbitration. In some
jurisdictions, arbitration has become a thorn in the side of
the public court system so that judges and lawmakers engage
in reforms in order to regain market share. Explaining what
particular features of the domestic litigation system the
parties seek to contract out of is anything but easy, and the
answer will vary across jurisdictions. With regard to the
American market,134 however, arbitration promises some
additional advantages it misses elsewhere, namely of
foreclosing class actions,135 of curtailing discovery,136 and of
getting rid of juries as decision-makers.137

133. See supra Part IV.A.2.
134. See, e.g., the RAND study by DOUGLAS SHONZ ET AL., BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES, PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL (2011).
135. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). As to New
York law, see Ranieri v. Bell Atl. Mobile, 759 N.Y.S.2d 448 (App. Div. 2003).
Christopher Drahozal and Stephen Ware found that “all of the arbitration clauses
in consumer contracts (20 of 20, or 100%) contained a class arbitration waiver.”
Drahozal & Ware, supra note 129, at 444.
136. As to the limits, see Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
137. See SHONZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 15-16; Drahozal, Unfair Clauses, supra
note 90, 710-12.
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Beyond these special features, a strong factor weighing
in favor of arbitration as compared to litigation is
confidentiality.138 Proceedings in public court are just that—
open to the public—so that third parties and journalists have
a right to attend and observe them and to inform the public
accordingly. In contrast, arbitral proceedings are typically
kept private so that no one apart from the parties, their
advisors, and the arbitrators, obtain knowledge of the facts
disclosed and discussed in the course of the proceedings. The
arbitration rules of many institutions impose additional
duties of confidentiality on parties, counsel, and
arbitrators.139 Together, these rules foreclose the most
important source of collateral harm that the parties might
otherwise suffer in the process of dispute resolution.140
A second advantage of domestic arbitration as compared
to litigation is the right to choose the decision-makers in
person, rather than choosing a court as an institution.141 In
the selection process, they may consider a range of concerns,
such as their preference for a lawyer familiar with the legal
issues raised by the particular case, or for an industry
insider, or the desire to sidestep strict legal analysis by
138. SHONZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 18-19.
139. Rule 23 AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440#R23 (“The arbitrator and the AAA shall
maintain the privacy of the hearings unless the law provides to the contrary . . . It
shall be discretionary with the arbitrator to determine the propriety of the
attendance of any other person other than a party and its representatives.”); Rule
26 JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures, available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules (“JAMS and the
Arbitrator shall maintain the confidential nature of the Arbitration proceeding
and the Award, including the Hearing, except as necessary in connection with a
judicial challenge to or enforcement of an Award, or unless otherwise required by
law or judicial decision . . . The Arbitrator may exclude any non-Party from any
part of a Hearing.”); Art. 26 (3) ICC Arbitration and ADR Rules, available at
http://www.iccwbo.org (“Save with the approval of the arbitral tribunal and the
parties, persons not involved in the proceedings shall not be admitted.”). Art. 22
(3) ICC Arbitration Rules adds that “the arbitral tribunal may make orders
concerning the confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings or of any other
matters in connection with the arbitration and may take measures for protecting
trade secrets and confidential information.”
140. See supra Part III.C.2.
141. SHONZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 16-17.
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avoiding the involvement of lawyers as arbitrators. The
opportunity to choose the decision-maker promotes the joint
interest in accuracy, in the sense of enforcement of the
incentive scheme set up by the parties in their contract.142
Still, the advantage of arbitration in terms of accuracy is
not beyond doubt. It has been suggested that arbitrators are
reluctant to actually decide cases on the merits and to stick
faithfully to the contract they are called upon to enforce. 143
They may have an incentive to seek compromises by entering
quasi-Solomonic awards—that do no more than splitting the
difference—because they want to avoid antagonizing one of
the parties. Disappointing one of the disputants by entering
a clear-cut decision against it may cause this party to resist
that decision-maker’s future appointments as arbitrator in
other cases. Because arbitrators depend on future business,
they will want to avoid such an outcome. Plausible as this
theory may sound, it seems difficult to accept that potential
disputants share the interest in clear-cut decisions reached
under a resolute application of the relevant contractual and
legal rules ex ante, but forget about this preference ex post
and sanction arbitrators who live up to this interest by
refusing their reappointment.144
The other concerns that are frequently put forward to
explain the attractiveness of arbitration—savings in costs
and time—turn out to be weak upon closer inspection.145 As
far as costs are concerned, much depends on the court system
that arbitration is compared to. In any case, the fees charged
by three self-employed professionals serving as arbitrators
will almost always be higher than the fees charged by a court
subsidized by the public. Whether it is possible to make up
this structural disadvantage by getting rid of the costly
142. See supra Part IV.A.1.3.
143. SHONZ ET AL., supra note 134, at 11-12; Brunet, supra note 123, at 42-47.
144. Cf. Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not “Split
the Baby”—Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitrations, 18 J.
INT’L ARB. 573 (2001). The RAND study found that corporate counsel thought that
arbitrators tended to come out in the middle even though the data gathered from
a sample of arbitral awards did not support this fear. Cf. SHONZ ET AL., supra note
134, at 11-12.
145. See Drahozal & Ware, supra note 129, at 447-49.
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appeals processes available in the public system will depend
on the individual case. The same reasoning is more or less
true for the alleged advantage in delay. Arbitral proceedings
may drag on for a long time as it is necessary to coordinate
the calendars of at least five professional lawyers, i.e. the two
attorneys representing the parties plus the three lawyers
serving as arbitrators. In addition, much depends on the
particular procedure that is chosen in arbitration. While
trade association arbitration follows a no-frills approach that
streamlines procedures, focuses on documents, and dispenses
with discovery,146 arbitration of international commercial
disputes resembles litigation in court more and more. In as
much as arbitration assumes the style of litigation, the
potential for substantial savings in cost and time is lost.147
In summary, the advantages of arbitration as compared
to litigation in public court in the domestic context come in
the form of reduced administrative costs, less collateral harm
thanks to confidentiality, and greater accuracy. These
conclusions were confirmed by the above-cited survey of
European businesses. Even though the study was premised
exclusively on cross-border transactions, 63% of respondents
said that they preferred arbitration because of
confidentiality, 21% because of speed, and 3% because of
costs.148
D. Evidence of Competition Between Civil Justice Systems
Western systems of civil procedure acknowledge and
protect the freedom of the parties to vest jurisdiction in the
court of their choice.149 In practice, many parties make use of
146. See Brunet, supra note 123, at 51-61.
147. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 6-7, 11-20 (2010); see also Richard Chernick et al., The Future of
Commercial Arbitration, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 415, 416-22 (2009).
148. VOGENAUER & HODGES, supra note 130, at 46.
149. Compare Council Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of 12 Dec. 2012, art. 25,
2012 O.J. (L 351) (providing for strict enforcement of forum-selection clauses,
provided that certain formal requirements have been complied with), with
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991), and M/S Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (providing examples of American courts
enforcing forum-selection clauses).
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this freedom, as forum selection clauses are a staple in
international and domestic transactions. The question is
whether the parties, in ascribing jurisdiction, act on the
preferences identified above, i.e. that they search for a forum
that offers the best balance of accuracy and costs. There is
empirical evidence suggesting that this is in fact the case.
A recent survey by Eisenberg and Miller of contracts filed
with the SEC in connection with “current reports” involved
no less than 2,865 contracts of different variety that were
analyzed with regard to their choice-of-law and choice-offorum clauses.150 The authors found that the correlation
between the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law decision was
close to perfect, i.e. 100%.151 The fact that the parties align
their choice-of-law and choice-of-forum decisions supports
the proposition that they search for the optimal mix of
accuracy in adjudication and litigation costs. It is fair to
assume that the court sitting in the jurisdiction, the law of
which was chosen, is in the best position to apply that law
accurately, and at low cost, as its judges are the ones with
the greatest proficiency in the applicable law. For this
reason, the best option the parties have is to vest jurisdiction
in the courts of the state whose law they choose.
As to the choice between jurisdictions, the study revealed
that New York law was chosen in 46% of all contracts,152 and
that 41% of the contracts containing a forum-selection clause
designated the New York courts.153 The dominance of New
York as a venue for commercial litigation is not the result of
happenstance but rather the product of many factors, which
are similar to those that made London, Paris, Zurich, and
Geneva popular locations for international arbitrations.154 As
the commercial capital of the U.S. and host to the nation’s
leading law firms, New York City is a natural pick for
corporate executives and their advisors, if only for its
150. Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 10, at 1487-89.
151. Id. at 1506.
152. The rate was even higher if merger contracts were excluded with their
disproportionate share of clauses invoking Delaware law. Id. at 1489-92.
153. Id. at 1504.
154. See infra Part V.A.
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proximity.155 For this reason, New York’s courts were able to
develop skills and gain experience in the resolution of
commercial disputes that attracted even more business.156
The judges and lawmakers in the State of New York
contributed their own share in making the city the preferred
venue for business litigation. The most important policy
choices made in New York to strengthen the jurisdiction as a
venue for the resolution of commercial disputes was to honor
choice of law and forum selection clauses as long as they
remain within the bounds set by the exceptions of public
policy and fraud in the inducement, which in turn are
construed narrowly and applied with great care.157
On top of that, in the course of the 1990s, New York
created the Commercial Division of its Supreme Court, first
in New York County and later in other districts of the state.
The idea behind this initiative was to offer high-quality
judicial services for the resolution of high-stakes commercial
cases in an effort to attract more such business to the state.
Today, the Commercial Division advertises its services in a
similar manner to private arbitration institutions.158 In the
judgment of the legal community in New York, the
Commercial Division manages to live up to this selfdescription, as it is regarded as an “unqualified success.”159
155. For a full development of the “New York Hypothesis,” see Eisenberg &
Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 10, at 1481-87.
156. As to network effects, see infra, Part V.A.
157. See Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 2073, 2080-92 (2009).
158. Commercial Division N.Y. Supreme Court, History, http://nycourts.gov/
courts/comdiv/history.shtml (“The Commercial Division serves as a forum for
resolution of complicated commercial disputes. Successful resolution of these
disputes requires particular expertise across the broad and complex expanse of
commercial law. . . . The caseload of the Division is thus very demanding,
requiring of the court scholarship in commercial law, experience in the
management of complex cases, and a wealth of energy. The Commercial Division
has actively sought to employ advanced technology to assist in handling its
caseload effectively.”).
159. Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation and
Jurisdiction of Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAWYER 147, 158
(2004) (quoting Tamara Loomis, Commercial Division: High-Profile Case Casts
Spotlight on Well-Regarded Court, N.Y.L.J. June 20, 2002, at 5).
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E. Is Bilateral Competition Desirable?
1. Accuracy of Adjudication Promotes Social Welfare
The question remains whether competition between the
courts of different jurisdictions, as well as between judicial
and arbitral resolution of disputes, promotes social welfare.
With regard to unilateral choice of forum the answer has
been in the negative.160 Bilateral competition is different.
Rational parties are interested in maximizing the pie
through the choice of efficient contract terms and default
rules. For the incentive schemes set up by the parties and the
lawmakers to work, there must be an enforcement
mechanism that sanctions non-compliance, but leaves
compliant parties alone. In fact, the law and economics
literature always assumes, without saying so, that the
efficient incentive scheme set up by the substantive law or
the parties’ agreement is enforced accurately in cases of noncompliance. More precisely, for the incentive schemes of the
substantive law to work, there must be a procedural
mechanism that sanctions offenders and spares innocent
parties.161
On this view, society at large is nothing but a large group
of potential litigants. In parallel to the two parties to a
contract, rational members of society would choose the court
that promises to enforce efficient contracts and efficient legal
rules accurately, subject to cost. The parties’ incentives to
choose an accurate court are congruent with the social
interest in courts that minimize the costs of error.162
2. A Race to the Top
If it is true that the parties jointly prefer courts and
tribunals that render accurate decisions, more precisely, that
balance accuracy and costs in an optimal way, and that
arbitrators, judges and lawmakers respond to this demand,
then bilateral competition results in a race to the top.
Bilateral competition creates incentives for the decision160. See supra Part III.F.
161. See supra Part IV.A.1.
162. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 103.
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makers in the judicial systems and in arbitral institutions to
improve accuracy up to the point where further advances
come at a cost that outweighs the benefits. The result is a
dynamic process that favors those courts and institutions
that are best in balancing accuracy and costs and that are
most responsive to whatever other preferences the parties
might have jointly. While unilateral competition imposes
costs on society, bilateral competition promotes welfare.
3. Efficient Courts and Inefficient Law
The proposition that accuracy in adjudication promotes
social welfare only holds true if the substantive law
governing the subject matter of the dispute promotes social
welfare too. The private interest in accuracy maps on to the
corresponding social interest only if the contract that stands
to be enforced is itself efficient. On the assumption that the
parties wrote a contract that maximizes social welfare, the
accurate enforcement of such a contract maximizes social
welfare as well. It is generally assumed that the parties write
efficient contracts, but not all disputes involve contractual
obligations. Where the suit is based on tort or some other
statutory or judge-made rule of non-contractual liability,
accuracy in dispute resolution contributes to social welfare
only if the rule itself is efficient. The meticulous enforcement
of an inefficient rule does not promote social welfare but does
just the opposite.
If the assumption of efficient substantive rules is relaxed,
matters become more complicated. Where the parties are
authorized to contract around the inefficient rule, they will
do so and search for a court that promises to accurately
implement their agreement instead of the legal rule. Where
the inefficient substantive rule is mandatory, the parties will
be lost in public court, regardless of the forum they happen
to choose. However, they might still be able to get away with
a contractual derogation from the inefficient rule if they find
a decision-maker willing to enforce their bargain. Arbitrators
may be prepared to do just that in an effort to compete away
business from the courts.
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IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFICIENT MARKETS IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION

A. Network Effects
The evidence from the world of international arbitration
as well as from the litigation market within the United
States suggests that the race to the top is seriously delayed
by network effects that help established jurisdictions to
defend their advantage, even if outperformed by other, lessestablished ones.163 Network externalities explain why
markets for consumer electronic appliances such as personal
computers, DVD-players, and smart phones tend to gravitate
towards a small number of technological standards, or even
a single one. In essence, the more consumers become
members of a community of users of a particular product
standard, the more valuable such products become for all the
members of the community. With the presence of network
effects, markets are subject to first-mover and lock-in effects.
Firms that are successful in establishing a network of users
may defend their position much more easily than they would
otherwise because their customers face substantial costs of
switching to another product-standard, even if the latter is
superior.
The same forces operating with regard to certain
products that cause the market to gravitate towards a small
number of technological standards have been shown to be at
work in the market for corporate charters, where the
persistent domination of Delaware is best explained by the
first-mover advantage.164 Contract terms are another
163. See supra Part IV.D.
164. For a historical account of the development leading to the dominance of
Delaware replacing New Jersey as the front runner in the charter business
market, see Cary, supra note 17, at 664-65; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuck,
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. R. 1437, 1443 (1992); David Charny, Competition
among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American
Perspective on the “Race to the Bottom” in the European Communities, 32 HARV.
INT’L. L.J. 423, 427-28 (1991); Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal
Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209,
213-14 (2006).
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“product” that is susceptible to network effects.165 The more
parties use a particular system of contract law, the greater
the system’s utility for the users. However, the additional
utility generated by a popular system of contract law is not
generated by abstract legal rules, but by the day-to-day work
of courts and commentators.166 Where contracts made under
a particular law are plenty, disputes will tend to be numerous
too, so that the courts find enough cases to apply, clarify, and
amplify abstract legal standards. The legal profession
collaborates with the courts in this enterprise, and gains in
expertise and experience as well.
What is true for contract terms is also true for arbitration
and adjudication. In fact, contract terms and judicial dispute
resolution are bundled together, as the precise meaning and
validity of contract terms and default rules cannot be
determined without reference to case law developed by the
courts.167 Rational parties interested in accurate enforcement
of their bargain are well-advised to select the dispute
resolution mechanism and the applicable law in tandem, as
a package, rather than one after another. As empirical
studies have revealed, choice of law and choice of forum are
bundled together so that everything that has been said with
regard to the choice of contract terms also applies to the
choice of judicial services.168
As a consequence, the market for judicial services will be
haunted by network effects as well. The history of the
business courts in the United States provides an example as
it suggests that the market for high-quality judicial services
is subject to serious first-mover effects.169 Even though the
example of New York was copied by many other states, these
“subsequent movers” never managed to break the dominance
165. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 774-89 (1995).
166. Id. at 775-79, 782-84 (detailing “interpretive network externalities” and
“legal services network externalities,” respectively).
167. See supra Part IV.D.
168. See Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra, note 10, at 1487-89,
1509-10.
169. For a brief history of New York’s Commercial Division, see Commercial
Division N.Y. Supreme Court, supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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of New York.170 The same is true in the market for
international arbitrations that is dominated by a small set of
well-established venues, i.e. Zurich, Geneva, Paris, and
London.171 It takes time and persistent diligence to build up
a reputation for excellence in business litigation and in the
support of international arbitral proceedings. The better the
quality of the law, the richer the case law interpreting and
applying the substantive and procedural rules; and the
broader the experience of the courts, the more attractive a
jurisdiction becomes as the preferred venue for business
litigation, commercial arbitration, or incorporation of
companies. Once a jurisdiction and its courts have gained an
edge over competitors, it becomes extremely difficult for the
latter to catch up and to lure litigants into their own courts
and arbitration venues.
If network effects do exist in the market for dispute
resolution, then the conclusion that competition in this
market will result in a race to the top must be qualified. The
first-mover and lock-in effects prevent the actors on the
demand side of the market, i.e. the parties seeking dispute
resolution services, from selecting offers which are superior
to the established ones on a stand-alone basis, but lack the
positive network effects that come with an entrenched
market position.172 As a consequence, well-established
jurisdictions may be able to defend their position and
continue dominating the market even though they are well
off the mark, i.e. fail to satisfy the parties’ preferences to the
greatest extent at least cost.
B. Agency Problems
1. Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses
The preceding analysis was premised on the parameters
that rational parties use in making the choice between
different mechanisms or institutions of dispute resolution
such as courts and arbitral tribunals. In reality, however, it
170. For an overview of the landscape of the business courts, see Bach &
Applebaum, supra note 159, at 160-228.
171. See supra Part IV.D.
172. Klausner, supra note 165, at 789-825.
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is a rare exception that the parties negotiate and agree on a
dispute resolution clause in person. In real-world
transactions, at least the technical provisions of contracts are
normally drafted and negotiated by attorneys, not by the
parties themselves. More sophisticated parties will take an
interest even in these clauses and probably bring in-house
counsel to the negotiating table in order to oversee the
process, but this is only done where the stakes are high. In
the remaining cases, the attorney remains in charge and
advises the client about the perceived benefits and costs of
one option or another.
2. Lawyers as Agents of Their Clients
It is received wisdom that the relationship between the
client and his lawyer creates a principal-agent problem.173
The incentives of lawyer and client are not identical as the
lawyer has an interest in maximizing her income from fees,
whereas the client is interested in maximizing the balance of
the sum received on his claim in settlement or upon litigation
minus the costs involved in the process, including the fees
charged by his lawyer. In addition, the lawyer, as the agent,
enjoys an informational advantage over her client with
regard to the legal issues involved, including the parameters
that should enter the choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
decisions to be made by the client. Thus, the client is unable
to fully observe his lawyer and to sanction deviations from
the course of action that is in his best interest, and the lawyer
is in a position to exploit her client. The distortion of the
lawyer’s incentives and the resultant losses to the client have
been explored at length with regard to areas such as
remuneration of lawyers, particularly the choice between
hourly fees and contingency fees, and the decision to either

173. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 103, at 431-34; Dammann & Hansmann,
supra note 10, at 17-18; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing
Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 509, 527-29 (1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Issues in
Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL. STUD. 189 (1987).
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settle or litigate.174 In contrast, the principal-agent problems
involved in the choice of forum or other dispute resolution
mechanisms have not been the subject of systematic
exploration as of yet.175
3. The Choice-of-Forum Decision
For a self-interested lawyer who wants to maximize fee
revenue, the overriding objective is to keep herself in
business and not to lose the client to somebody else.
Otherwise, there will be no fees to earn at all. The prime
objective of not losing the client to a competing lawyer would
be inconsequential if lawyers were admitted in any court
anywhere, but this is not reality. All over the world, lawyers
are admitted only in the courts of a particular jurisdiction
and are thus not authorized to represent the client in courts
outside of this jurisdiction. Within the U.S., lawyers are
restricted to the jurisdiction in which they are licensed to
practice, and while ownership of multiple licenses is possible,
attorneys practicing in a multitude of states are the
exception.176 Even absent regulations tying lawyers to
particular courts and areas, clients are well advised to retain
the services of local counsel as procedural rules and actual
court practices vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from
court to court. It is highly risky and may even amount to
malpractice if a lawyer represents a client in a court of whose
routine and procedure she knows nothing about. For these
reasons, the preference for hometown justice that has been
identified as an important heuristic in cases of unilateral
forum choice by rational plaintiffs177 will be much stronger in
attorneys than in their clients.
174. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 103, at 431-34 (exploring the incentives under
various billing mechanisms); Miller, supra note 173 (exploring the distortion of
incentives to settle); cf. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 86, at 435-37.
175. See David P. Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of the Civil
Justice System, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 48, at 375-77
(analysing the choice of law and choice of forum decisions without taking the
agency problem into account).
176. Regarding choice of forum in disputes involving corporate law, cf. Larry E.
Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L.
999, 1010-11 (1994).
177. See supra Part III.D.1.
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The fact that lawyers have a strong incentive for
hometown justice is bad news for competition between
judicial systems. Even if counsel realizes that an out-of-state
court is superior to the municipal one, she will resist advising
the client to take advantage of the foreign court because that
would involve sending him to a competitor. This pessimistic
conclusion need not be the end of the story, as the legal
profession has evolved in ways that mitigate the anticompetitive tendency of local practice. The emergence and
growth of large law firms operating nationwide and
internationally tends to alleviate the preference for
hometown justice. A law firm that has offices in every major
jurisdiction need not fear losing the client upon the
recommendation of turning to a foreign venue. The local
office at the seat of the optimal court could take over the
client, and the firm would not lose any revenue.
Even within firms with offices in many jurisdictions, it
would be naive to think that the trend towards hometown
justice simply goes away. Large law firms are anything but a
family business contributing to a common pool of revenue,
but are rather a more or less tight band of local offices. There
definitely remains inter-office competition between local
offices as well as intra-office competition between partners
practicing in the same office. As a consequence, a partner
practicing in jurisdiction A will not feel indifferent about
losing a client to a colleague practicing in an office of the
same firm in jurisdiction B, even if the courts in B outperform
those in A. This may explain the strong demand for
arbitration in international commercial cases involving
sophisticated parties. In contrast to litigation in public
courts, representing a client in arbitration does not require
that counsel be admitted to the bar at the seat of arbitration.
Resorting to arbitration enables counsel to correctly advise
the client to opt out of the local court system without the risk
of losing him to a competitor.
C. Externalities
1. Demonstrating and Developing the Law
Dispute resolution is not the sole function of judicial
systems. It is helpful to further differentiate the so-called
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rulemaking function of the judicial system into two subcategories, one being the interpretation and application of
the law to individual disputes, the second being the
development of new legal rules.
The interpretation and application of abstract legal
norms to specific fact patterns informs the public, including
potential litigants of the future, about the legal rules,
standards, and requirements, as they apply to actual
behavior. The display of the “law in action,” or rather, “the
law as it applies to individual cases,” to parties in a similar
position as the current litigants yields important benefits.
Those parties who are already entangled in a dispute similar
to the one that was just resolved receive valuable guidance
as to the prospective outcome of litigation in their own case.
This enables the parties to form realistic expectations about
the probabilities of winning or losing, which in turn furthers
their chances of reaching an amicable settlement. Needless
to say, early settlement promotes the interests of both the
litigants and the public, as it helps to save substantial
resources that would otherwise be spent on litigation.
Furthermore, publicized decisions of the courts help
parties who still find themselves in the position ex ante, in
the course of negotiating their contract, to draft their
contract in accordance with their preferences. Where the
court, in a prior judgment, interpreted a default rule, they
may want to contract around it; where the court interpreted
contract language, the litigants of the future will know better
which words and phrases to use and which to avoid. Where
the subject matter of the prior dispute involved a mandatory
rule, the parties might want to avoid its application by using
a different legal framework that does better in translating
their preferences into a viable legal instrument.
The benefits just described are not being generated by
the interpretation and application of the law as such, but by
its interpretation and application under the eyes of the public
and by a competent authority. If the courts kept their
decisions secret, potential disputants would be left without a
blueprint for the resolution of their disputes and without
guidance for adjusting their behavior. However, the
publication of judicial decisions is not the only thing that
matters; another one is the requirement that they are made
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by a competent body wielding sovereign power. It does not
help much if three law professors draw together, form a
panel, try a case, and then publish their interpretation of the
law and its application to an individual fact pattern. Private
judicial bodies lack the power necessary to interpret and
apply the law with public authority, and are thus unable to
establish precedent that provides guidance for disputes of the
future.
The same considerations also apply to the rulemaking
function in the narrow and technical sense, i.e. the
development of the law into new areas not anticipated by the
courts and lawmakers of the past. Again, any benefits of
judicial development of the law and the making of new rules
depend on published legal opinions. Bold decisions would
remain inconsequential if they were taken privately and
remained “in camera.”
2. Externalities of Arbitration
The fact that the choice of dispute resolution mechanisms
other than litigation in court may do harm to the
amplification and rulemaking functions of the courts is well
known from the interface of litigation and arbitration. One
striking illustration is the drying up of the stream of court
decisions in disputes between securities dealers and their
clients after the U.S. Supreme Court reversed its course in
the case of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon
and affirmed the arbitrability of statutory claims arising
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.178 On its face, this
decision strengthened the role of party autonomy in honoring
arbitration agreements, but in reality it led to a complete
shift away from litigation in public court to the benefit of
arbitration organized by the exchanges or under the auspices

178. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227-38 (1987).
The authority of the parties to refer disputes to arbitration includes claims arising
under the RICO Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (2012); Shearson, 482 U.S. at 242;
Kowalski v. Chi. Tribune Co., 854 F.2d 168, 173 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.). Prior
decisions held that RICO claims were not arbitrable. S.A. Mineracao da
Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah Int’l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 196 (2d Cir. 1984).
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of the NASD and, today, of FINRA.179
With regard to the externality problem, the crucial point
is not the often-heard criticism that securities arbitration
disadvantages the “one-shotter” plaintiff to the benefit of the
repeat player,180 but the dearth of public trials and rulings
accessible to the public that results from taking whole
categories of disputes private by way of arbitration. While it
is true that the NASD and FINRA tried to address this
concern by requiring that awards be published,181 publication
is of little value because more than 90% of the awards
rendered in securities arbitration come without reasons.182
Arbitral decisions that do not disclose the underlying
reasoning and that, consequently, do not cite any precedent
are practically worthless as contributions to the
amplification and development of the law.183
The disinterest in reasoned opinions and the avoidance
of precedent that characterizes securities arbitration does
not characterize arbitration in general, as arbitral routine in
other areas may be entirely different. Arbitral tribunals
dealing with employment disputes routinely provide reasons
and draw on precedent, primarily in the form of judicial

179. See William W. Park, Amending the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 75, 105-06 (2002); Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation:
The Brave New World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1107
(1993).
180. Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); cf. Edward Brunet &
Jennifer J. Johnson, Substantive Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L.
REV. 459, 486-91 (2008); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled
Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 60-66 (1997). But see Drahozal, Unfair Clauses,
supra note 90, at 749-71.
181. FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY (FINRA), CODE OF
ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES § 12904(h) (2013) (“All awards
shall be made publicly available.”).
182. Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and
Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123, 144 (2005); W. Mark C.
Weidemaier, Judging Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1091, 1104 (2012).
183. Brunet & Johnson, supra note 180, at 472-74.
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decisions, to support their legal conclusions.184 But even then,
the decision of an arbitral tribunal is not the same as a
judgment of a court of law.185 It cannot be challenged on
appeal, so that decisions of intermediate courts of appeal that
may serve as a laboratory for testing the available options
and supporting arguments never happen. On the assumption
that the appeals process is not a legal nicety, but an effort not
only in improving accuracy of decision-making but also at
amplifying and developing the law at least cost,186 an arbitral
system of dispute resolution misses out entirely. The point is
not that arbitrators do worse than courts of first instance or
even appellate judges. If they were, the parties would be illadvised to contract out of the court system in favor of
arbitration and one could trust that, over time, the parties
would remedy the problem and come back to the judicial
system. The point is rather that the parties choose a dispute
resolution mechanism that may be good for them
individually, without taking account of the interest of the
general public, i.e. future litigants, in authoritative
interpretation and application, as well as the development of
the law.187 The arbitrators and the parties who have to pay
for their services take a free ride on the efforts of the public
courts to interpret, amplify, and develop the law.
The free-riding of the parties to arbitral proceedings on
the public court system is rather harmless as long as there is
a constant stream of judicial opinions. Obviously, not only
money but also court decisions are subject to the law of
decreasing marginal utility. If a judicial system decides a few
thousand civil cases per year, society can easily dispense with
a dozen, a hundred, or even a thousand cases that go to
arbitration. But this is true only if these cases are drawn
more or less at random from the pool of all disputes so that
the courts still see cases of all varieties. Problems arise if
arbitration is so pervasive in one particular area that there
184. Weidemaier, supra note 182, at 1111-24.
185. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895, 1947-49, 1952 (2010).
186. See Shavell, Error Correction, supra note 96, at 415-17.
187. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 248-49; Shavell, Error Correction,
supra note 96, at 424.
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are no more court decisions to guide arbitral decision making
at all. In the U.S., this has been the outcome in the area of
securities litigation against brokers, but also with regard to
some types of consumer transactions where arbitration has
become de-facto mandatory.188
3. Opting into the Court System of Another
Jurisdiction
The frustration of the rule-demonstration and rulemaking functions of judicial dispute resolution is not limited
to agreements steering cases away from the courts and
towards arbitral tribunals. The same problem may arise
where the parties opt out of the court system of one
jurisdiction and into the judicial system of another.189 To the
extent that the prorogated court applies the law of another
jurisdiction rather than its own, its decision will not count as
precedent in the courts of the derogated jurisdiction. But
even if this were otherwise and the judges in the derogated
jurisdiction paid attention to the rulings of their brothers and
sisters abroad, the judges of the prorogated court have little
incentive to invest their scarce resources in terms of time and
energy into the amplification and the development of foreign
law. It is received wisdom that the quality of judicial
decisions made under foreign law is not the same as the one
of decisions applying the lex fori.190 The courts of the
derogated jurisdiction, in turn, accord no precedential, or
even persuasive, value to decisions reached in other
jurisdictions.
There is an obvious way to circumvent all these concerns,
and that is to realign forum selection and choice of law by
opting into the substantive law of the same jurisdiction that
also hosts the forum. The court will then apply its own law
188. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 (2004); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,1638 (2005).
189. See Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 10, at 18-20.
190. Th. M. De Boer, Facultative Choice of Law, in 257 COLLECTED COURSES OF
223, 316-28 (1997).
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with the same diligence and care as in purely domestic cases,
and the precedential value of the decision that is ultimately
reached is out of the question. In fact, empirical studies have
shown that most parties make forum selection decisions that
map onto their choice of law decisions.191 In theory, one could
imagine an outcome where the parties escape from an
individual jurisdiction in large numbers, choosing foreign law
and selecting the respective court system so that the courts
in the derogated jurisdiction are rendered idle.
Such a scenario would create problems for both
jurisdictions. The winning jurisdiction that attracts all the
additional business from abroad will suffer from a winner’s
curse of a special variety as the perceived advantage of
judicial services will clog its courts and delay the resolution
of the disputes brought by its own citizens and taxpayers.
The host jurisdiction would be forced to counteract this effect
by raising court fees to the level necessary to cover costs or to
adopt a split fee system; one for domestic and international
transactions involving at least one of its own citizens and
another schedule with elevated fees for cases between two
foreign parties.192 The net effect for the host jurisdiction will
still be positive since importing disputes from abroad
amounts to an export of legal services that creates local
revenue and contributes to the public purse through sales
and income taxes.
Even if the balance for the host jurisdiction may remain
positive, the net effect for the derogated jurisdiction is
necessarily, and unavoidably, negative. On the realistic
assumption that citizens turning to foreign courts are forced
to solicit the services of the bar in the country of destination,
the flight from one jurisdiction amounts to an import of legal
services that must be compensated for by exports of other
goods and services. Furthermore, a jurisdiction that lost its
judicial business to a competitor would cut off the stream of
judicial decisions that illustrate, amplify, and develop the
law. It would abdicate essential parts of its sovereign power
to another jurisdiction that gained the upper hand in the
191. See Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 10, at 1487-90.
192. This option is explored and embraced by Dammann & Hansmann, supra
note 10, at 59-69. It must be noted that there are serious constitutional
restrictions that may destroy the proposal of differentiated court fees.
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development of the law governing private transactions. On
the assumption that state law is shaped by the preferences of
the respective constituency, these preferences would be
frustrated.
VI. THE CHOICE BETWEEN UNILATERAL AND BILATERAL
COMPETITION
The preceding analysis of competition of judicial systems
has led to split results: while unilateral competition of
plaintiffs for a favorable court will instigate a race to the
bottom, bilateral competition of both parties for an optimal
court rather suggests a race to the top that offers the best
tradeoff of accuracy and costs. The forces created by the two
kinds of competition are not congruent; rather, they pull in
opposite directions. While the unilateral demand of plaintiffs
leads courts to adopt ever more expansive rules of
jurisdiction and fact-gathering, and ever more victimfriendly rules on choice of law, aggregation of claims, and
liability to the detriment of defendants based outside of the
jurisdiction, bilateral competition creates incentives to
accurately enforce the bargain made by the parties, as well
as to implement efficient rules of law. It seems that
jurisdictions must make a choice whether they want to
compete on one dimension or the other, as an open heart for
plaintiffs is at odds with striving for accuracy. Lawmakers
and judges need to decide whether to afford plaintiffs ever
more generous protection or whether to strictly enforce the
contracts made by the parties and efficient rules of law that
apply to the facts of the case at hand.
Against this background, it comes as a surprise that the
empirical findings of Eisenberg and Miller on the most
popular venues for business litigation are contradicting the
ranking of state liability systems by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce.193 In this survey, New York performs poorly,
occupying the twenty-third rank among the states,194 while it
193. Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 10, at 1500.
194. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 2010 STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING
STUDY, 14, 89 [hereinafter U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE], available at
http://court.state.de.us/Superior/pdf/harris_2010.pdf.
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was identified as the preferred venue for commercial
litigation in the U.S.195 How can that be? The fact that New
York performed so well in Eisenberg and Miller’s study and
so poorly in the eyes of the Chamber of Commerce suggests
that one of studies must have gotten it wrong. If jurisdictions
must make a choice whether to engage in unilateral
competition for more claims or in bilateral competition for
better outcomes, one would expect that New York ranked
first, or last, or occupied whatever rank in between, as long
as it was the same in both studies.
However, there might be an explanation for the opposite
findings that is consistent with the empirical findings of both
surveys. The source of the conflict seems to be that the
Eisenberg and Miller study focused on conflicts that grew out
of commercial contracts,196 while the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce’s ranking is based on the full range of disputes,
prominently including suits for damages in personal injury
cases, class actions, and mass torts.197 As a top priority for
state legislatures, the Chamber’s study nominates tort
reform and caps on damages—two topics that are close to
irrelevant for commercial litigation.198 It may well be that
New York, by creating the Commercial Division of its
Supreme Court, managed to set contract litigation apart from
other disputes in general, and from tort litigation in
particular. If this were true, the state managed to compete
on two fronts at the same time, namely for tort plaintiffs who
make the unilateral decision in favor of a friendly forum, and
for commercial parties negotiating a forum selection clause
in search of a court that strikes the optimal balance between
accuracy and costs.

195. Eisenberg & Miller, Flight to New York, supra note 10, at 1503-09.
196. Id. at 1487-89.
197. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 194, at 23, 25-26 (naming the
treatment of tort litigation, class actions and mass consolidation suits, and
damages among the key elements of the rankings).
198. Id. at 16.

